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ABSTRACT 
Killing or capturing an insurgent leader provides a means of eliminating the 
knowledge, charismatic power, and direction that the leader instills within the 
organization.  Technological breakthroughs in signal intelligence (SIGINT), an increase 
in the collection of human intelligence (HUMINT), and the beginning of the global war 
on terror have brought the employment of leadership decapitation as a means of 
collapsing insurgent organizations back into the consciousness of western society.  While 
the goal of government forces is to separate the insurgent leader from the organization, 
the techniques of killing or capturing insurgent leadership provide distinct advantages 
and drawbacks.  This thesis asks the research question: under what conditions is the 
targeted killing of an enemy leader preferable to the targeted incarceration of an enemy 
leader during counterinsurgency operations?  The analysis of four case studies provides 
the insight required to determine whether an insurgent organization is susceptible to 
collapse as a result of leadership decapitation.  This thesis finds that killing versus 
incarcerating a terrorist leader seems to make little difference.  Instead, insurgent 
organizations are most likely to collapse when they fail to name a successor, regardless of 
whether the leader is killed or captured.  Through careful study of an insurgent 
organization’s structure, military leaders can operationalize this thesis and develop a 
strategy to collapse an insurgent organization through leadership decapitation. 
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Killing or capturing an insurgent leader provides a means of eliminating the 
knowledge, charismatic power, and direction that the person provides the insurgent 
organization.  Technological breakthroughs in signal intelligence (SIGINT), an increase 
in the collection of human intelligence (HUMINT), and the beginning of the global war 
on terror have brought the employment of leadership decapitation as a means of 
collapsing insurgent organizations back into the consciousness of western society.  
Between 1803 and 1999, government forces have used leadership decapitation through 
either killing or capturing insurgent leaders 168 times.1  “Decapitation increases the 
incumbent’s chances of winning against these groups relative to their chances of victory 
against these groups in which insurgent leaders are not captured or killed.”2  Decapitation 
raises the probability of the government’s success in quelling an insurgency to 86%.3  
The removal of an insurgent leader disrupts the planning and operations of an 
organization, devastates the organization’s morale, and occasionally places more 
moderate leaders in positions of power.  While the goal of government forces is to 
separate the insurgent leader from the organization, the techniques of killing or capturing 
insurgent leadership provide distinct advantages and drawbacks.  Killing an insurgent 
leader increases the probability of collateral damage to the civilian population.  U.S. 
Predator strikes in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, and the Horn of Africa have eliminated 
key al Qaeda leaders but have also caused civilian casualties and the destruction of 
property.  Collateral damage degrades support for operations against al Qaeda both in the 
United States and abroad.  Though controversial, much of the existing literature claims 
that the targeted killing of insurgent and terrorist leaders increases the likelihood of an 
                                                 
1 Patrick Johnston, "The Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation in Counterinsurgency" (PhD 
dissertation , Center for International Security and Cooperation Stanford University), 1 (accessed June 7, 
2009). 
2 Ibid., 28. 
3 Ibid., 27. 
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escalation in violence following the killing.  While capturing insurgent leaders limits 
collateral damage and prevents increases in violence, insurgent leaders remain alive.  
Many insurgent leaders continue to direct operations against government forces and 
inspire subordinates while incarcerated.  Leadership decapitation removes insurgent 
leaders from direct influence over their organizations, but the second and third order 
effects of the tactics used to eliminate insurgent leadership affect the ultimate outcome of 
counterinsurgency operations. 
Insurgent leaders, knowing they are targeted by government forces, must make 
the critical decision to name a successor or not to name a successor.  Many insurgent 
leaders name a successor to prevent internal power struggles or infighting when the 
leader is killed or captured.  The presence of a second-in-command allows the insurgent 
leader to transfer his leadership legitimacy to his successor and also facilitates the 
continuation of insurgent operations once the leader is captured or killed by government 
forces.  However, by naming a successor, the leader allows government forces to target 
the second-in-command as well as the leader.  In organizations where no successor is 
named, new leaders must establish themselves in the hierarchy which results in delays in 
operations.  For example, following the death of Baitullah Mehsud, the leader of the 
Taliban in Pakistan, numerous people claimed authority to lead the Tehrik-i-Taliban.  The 
infighting resulted in the deaths of several Taliban leaders and the loss of time to conduct 
operations against the Pakistani Government.  On the other hand, some insurgent leaders 
may choose purposely to not name a successor in an attempt to maintain divisions among 
their subordinates and thus prevent potential coups or challenges of the leader’s power.  
Insurgent leaders must weigh the consequences of the decision to name a successor 
carefully. 
B. SCOPE 
The Global War on Terror has brought the strategy of targeted killings to the 
forefront of discussion in many political and military organizations.  While the decision 
to kill an insurgent leader is not taken lightly, there is much debate surrounding the 
effectiveness and correct application of the strategy.  Though recently brought back into 
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discussion, the strategy of targeted killings is not a new concept.  The Israelis have 
performed targeted killings against Palestinian militants for many years, the British are 
suspected of targeting Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) leadership with 
targeted killings and most recently, the United States has employed targeted killings 
against Islamic radicals in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, and the Horn of Africa (HoA).  An 
alternative to the targeted killing of insurgents is for states to selectively target and 
incarcerate insurgents.  Incarceration presents the state with a new set of benefits and 
drawbacks which must be reconciled against the option of targeted killing.  States must 
chose which option presents the most utility, and determine when each option is 
preferable.   
This thesis compares the effects of the targeted killing of insurgent leaders against 
the targeted incarceration of insurgent leaders.  The research question asks under what 
conditions is the targeted killing of an enemy leader preferable to the targeted 
incarceration of an enemy leader during counterinsurgency operations?  There are two 
independent variables (IV) in this study.  The first IV is the counterinsurgency strategy 
utilized to combat the insurgent leadership and can have a value of kill or capture.  The 
second IV is the naming of a leadership successor to the organization and has a value of 
either naming a clear successor to the current leader or not naming a clear successor to 
the current leader.  The dependent variable (DV) is identified as insurgent activity and is 
measured through the increase or decrease of enemy activity five years after the 
operation.  This study examines the interaction of the two independent variables to 
observe the variation in the dependent variable.   
This study will provide commanders with a better tool in their decision making 
process to determine if a target should be killed or captured.  Understanding the 
conditions which make an insurgent organization vulnerable to targeted killings or 
targeted incarcerations is powerful in undermining an insurgent organization’s stability.  
Military commanders and planners in counterinsurgency operations regularly face the 
decision to either kill or capture an enemy targeted personality.  The decision to kill an 
insurgent leader is required occasionally when terrain, weather, or distance prevent 
ground forces from reaching and incarcerating the target.  However, when insurgent 
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leaders have been captured and released multiple times, the target poses a threat to the 
state’s interests, or when the state sends a message to enemy combatants, the ground 
commander must weigh the costs and benefits of killing or incarcerating an insurgent.  
The decision to kill or incarcerate a target is carefully weighted, but often the criteria 
weighed are inexact and flexible leading to discrepancies among commands.  Providing a 
model which accurately weighs the factors will provide commanders with a tool to make 
better decisions. 
The findings of this study could be generalized to governments involved in 
counterinsurgency campaigns.  Relevant examples of these characteristics are Israeli 
operations against Hamas and Hezbollah, U.S. combat operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, 
and HoA, or the operations of Latin American Governments against insurgent networks 
such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC).   
C. THESIS ROADMAP 
This thesis will first examine the existing literature on targeted killing and 
targeted incarceration.  This literature outlines the advantages and disadvantages of 
employing targeted killings or targeted incarcerations in environments defined by 
counterterrorism operations, conventional military operations, and counterinsurgency 
operations.  Armed with an understanding of the existing arguments, an examination of a 
new theory is possible.  Utilizing the interaction of the state’s strategy of targeting 
insurgent leaders with the insurgent’s strategy of leadership succession as the foundation 
for discussion, this thesis will present several new ideas which will assist in combating 
and collapsing insurgent organizations.  Finally, four case studies will illustrate the new 
theory and provide the reader with lessons learned which may prove operational in 
current and future conflicts.   
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II. EXISTING LITERATURE 
The Global War on Terrorism continues to highlight the debate over the 
effectiveness of targeted killing against enemy leadership.  United States’ Special 
Operations Forces (SOF) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) regularly target and 
eliminate high value individuals (HVI) and terrorist cell leaders in an attempt to disrupt 
radical Islamist groups capable of influencing America’s global interests.  The expansion 
of Hellfire missile strikes launched from Predator drones in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, 
and the Horn of Africa (HoA) displays clearly the United States’ reliance on the tactic of 
leadership decapitation.  “Since President Obama took office, there have been reports of 
more than 40 attacks by Hellfire missiles fired from drones, an increase over the 
approximately 30 missile strikes launched in 2008 during the Bush administration.”4  
Ongoing conflicts between the Israeli Government and Palestinian terrorist organizations, 
as well as insurgencies in South America, Africa, and Southeast Asia emphasize the 
necessity of developing effective counterinsurgency and counterterrorism strategies.  
Researchers continue to analyze and discuss the effectiveness of Israel’s policy of 
leadership decapitation, but often overlook the growing requirement to study the 
effectiveness of leadership decapitation in terrorist organizations outside the 
Israeli/Palestinian conflict or against insurgencies.  To fully understand the 
overwhelming and often contradictory evidence surrounding targeted killing, it is 
important to examine the research conducted on the targeted killing of terrorist leaders, 
conventional military leaders, and insurgent leaders.  The first three sections of this 
chapter examine the existing literature on the decapitation of terrorist leadership, 
conventional military leadership, and insurgent leadership; the fourth section examines 
the effectiveness of the targeted incarceration of terrorist leadership; and the final section 
compares the advantages and disadvantages of targeted killing and targeted incarceration 
in a attempt to clarify the reader’s understanding of the topic. 
                                                 
4 Pam Benson, "White House OKs Expanding CIA Drone Program in Pakistan," CNN4 December, 
2009, www.cnn.com (accessed 4 December 2009). 
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A. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF TARGETED KILLINGS ON TERRORIST 
ORGANIZATIONS 
Counterterrorism organizations consistently seek methods to eliminate, defeat, or 
diminish terrorist organizations threatening the state’s authority.  Three main reasons are 
regularly cited by existing literature on the effectiveness of targeted killings: 1) targeted 
killings incapacitate terrorist organizations; 2) targeted killings deter additional terrorist 
violence against the state; and 3) targeted killing signals the determination of the state to 
fight terrorism. 
1. Incapacitation Effects of Targeted Killing 
The role of leadership in the incapacitation of terrorist organizations is well 
documented.  Kent Oots argues that leadership plays an integral role in the formation of 
terrorist organizations, and that a loss of leadership can facilitate the decline of an 
organization.  “In many instances, if the authorities can remove the leadership, an 
organization will cease to function.”5  As a result, counterterrorist organizations 
continually attempt to weaken terrorist organizations through the elimination or threat of 
elimination of key leadership.  “Terrorist groups rely heavily on the abilities and 
charisma of their top leaders.  When these leaders are removed, the organizations lose 
effectiveness and focus, become prone to infighting, and collapse.”6  Steven David 
echoes the assertion that charismatic leaders unite terrorist organizations and are difficult 
to replace, citing the diminished “effectiveness of Palestinian terrorist organizations 
where leadership, planning, and tactical skills are confined to a few key individuals.”7  
The elimination of key leaders also removes the individuals who possess the knowledge 
of operations, resources, financing, and synchronization of attacks.8  The destruction of 
human capital in leadership positions hinders the effectiveness of the organization to 
                                                 
5 Kent L. Oots, "Organizational Perspectives of the Formation and Disintegration of Terrorist Groups," 
Terrorism 12, no. 3 (1989), 141. 
6 Aaron Mannes, "Testing the Snake Head Strategy: Does Killing or Capturing its Leaders Reduce a 
Terrorist Group's Activity?" The Journal of International Policy Solutions 9 (Spring, 2008), 40. 
7 Steven R. David, "Fatal Choices: Israel's Policy of Targeted Killing," Ethics &International Affairs 
17, no. 1 (2003), 7. 
8 Daniel Byman, "Do Targeted Killings Work?" Foreign Affairs 85, no. 2 (March/April, 2006), 104. 
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conduct large-scale, coordinated attacks.  Replacing key terrorist leaders with equally 
skilled surrogates is difficult due to the years of training and experience required to 
effectively organize and support a terrorist network.9  The elimination of key terrorist 
leaders also forces the remaining leaders to go into hiding.  “To avoid elimination, the 
terrorists must constantly change locations, keep those locations secret, and keep their 
heads down, all of which reduces the flow of information in their organization and makes 
internal communications problematic and dangerous.”10  Motivating Palestinian fighters 
during Israel’s campaign against Hamas leadership was also difficult when Hamas’ 
leadership was in hiding.  “After Israel killed Yassin, Hamas appointed Rantisi as his 
successor.  Israel promptly killed Rantisi.  Hamas then announced that it had appointed a 
new leader but would not name him publicly: …hardly a way to inspire the group’s 
followers.”11  In addition, Daniel Byman observes that the Israeli policy of targeted 
killings “increases the number of attacks, but the number of Israeli deaths declines, 
indicating that the effectiveness of the attacks diminished.12   
While analytical evidence substantiates many of the above claims, the empirical 
evidence which grounds Jenna Jordan’s research lends an additional layer of credibility.  
The empirical research conducted by Jordan provides excellent statistical data to support 
many of the analytical claims made in the existing literature on targeted killing.  In her 
empirical study of Palestinian terrorist organizations, she concludes that targeted killings 
focused on members of a terrorist group’s upper echelons rather than simply removing 
leaders is most effective.13  “When only the leader was removed, the organization fell 
apart 33.33% of the time, and when members of the upper echelon were removed 54% of 
the organizations fell apart.”14  Jordan refutes the assertion that the removal of 
charismatic leaders results in the collapse of a terrorist organization.  She argues that 
                                                 
9 Byman, Do Targeted Killings Work?, 104. 
10 Ibid., 104. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid., 103. 
13 Jenna Jordan, "Leadership Decapitation of Terrorist Organizations" (Paper prepared for presentation 
at the International Studies Association, Montreal, Quebec, 2004), 1. 
14 Ibid., 28. 
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“charisma cannot predict when decapitation will be successful…if charisma can be 
transferred then the removal of a leader would not necessarily result in the collapse of an 
organization.”15  “Of the seventy-two cases of leadership decapitation examined in this 
study, forty-one of [the] organizations remained active after decapitation, while 31 fell 
apart.”16   
Mohammed Hafez and Joseph Hatfield’s empirical research on Palestinian 
violence during the Second Intifada presents a more neutral conclusion to the 
examination of targeted killings’ effectiveness in incapacitating a terrorist organization.  
Hafez and Hatfield’ research shows that “targeted assassinations show no promise for 
either increasing or decreasing the levels of Palestinian violence.”17   
While some research supports the assertion that targeted killings incapacitate 
terrorist organizations, other research refutes this assertion and claims that targeted 
killings actually increase the number of attacks and diminish the chances of successful 
negotiations.  The negative consequences of a policy of targeted killing can sometimes 
outweigh the advantages that the state gains.  “Killing terrorist leaders can also lead to 
negative consequences, including greater radicalization of the targeted terrorist group, 
elimination of possible negotiating partners, and the triggering of retaliatory attacks.”18   
The Israeli policy of targeted killing creates grievances within the Palestinian 
community and generates animosity between the population and governing authority.  
David Jaeger completed an analysis of Palestinian public opinion polls following Israeli 
targeted killings of Palestinian terrorists.  The analysis discovered that “Palestinian 
fatalities lead the Palestinian population to move away from more moderate positions.”19  
Mia Bloom also examines the public opinion effect of targeted killing and determines 
                                                 
15 Jordan, Leadership Decapitation of Terrorist Organizations, 4–6. 
16 Ibid., 17. 
17 Mohammed M. Hafez and Joseph M. Hatfield, "Do Targeted Assassinations Work? A Multivariate 
Analysis of Israel's Controversial Tactic during Al-Aqsa Uprising," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 29, 
no. 4 (June 2006), 371. 
18 Mannes, Testing the Snake Head Strategy: Does Killing or Capturing its Leaders Reduce a 
Terrorist Group's Activity?, 40. 
19 David Jaeger A. and others, The Struggle for Palestinian Hearts and Minds: Violence and Public 
Opinion in the Second Intifada (Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, [2008]). 
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that targeted killings “make Hamas’s rhetoric appear valid and prescient.”20  Peter 
Rosendorff expands on these arguments and states that the grievances of the Palestinian 
population produced by Israel’s policy of targeted killing increases the recruitment of 
new terrorists.21  This radicalization of the Palestinian population and the increased 
recruitment of the population into terrorist organizations not only decreases support for 
negotiations with Israel, but also increases violence directed towards Israel. 
Though numerous American presidents have emphasized the need to restart the 
Middle East peace process, the negotiations appear to accomplish few lasting results.  Or 
Honig points to Israel’s policy of targeted killings as a possible explanation for the 
failure.  “Killing the adversary’s leaders is counterproductive when it results in the 
elimination of a future negotiating partner.”22  Honig goes on to argue that targeted 
killings have entrenched Hamas’s popularity, undermined the image of the Palestinian 
Authority, and broken successful ceasefires between the two sides.23  As peace 
negotiations and ceasefires fail, Palestinian violence increases. 
Steven David argues that “No compelling evidence exists that targeted killing has 
reduced the terrorist threat against Israel.”24  In fact, most authors argue that targeted 
killings increase violence directed against the state.  Ethan Bueno de Mesquita and Eric 
Dickson state that “when counterterrorism imposes hardship on an aggrieved population, 
support for continued violence is likely to increase both because the opportunity costs of 
violence decrease and because the people conclude that the government is not concerned 
with their welfare.”25  Jaeger and Paserman follow this argument and state that targeted 
killings “may boost the desire for vengeance among Palestinians, facilitating the 
                                                 
20 Mia M. Bloom, "Palestinian Suicide Bombing: Public Support, Market Share, and Outbidding," 
Political Science Quarterly 119, no. 1 (2004), 65. 
21 B. Peter Rosendorff and Todd Sandler, "Too Much of a Good Thing? the Proactive Response 
Dilema," Journal of Conflict Resolution 48, no. 5 (October, 2004), 658. 
22 Or Honig, "Explaining Israel's Misuse of Strategic Assassinations," Studies in Conflict and 
Terrorism 30 (2007), 564. 
23 Ibid., 565–567. 
24 David, Fatal Choices: Israel's Policy of Targeted Killing, 8. 
25 Ethan Bueno de Mesquita and Eric S. Dickson, "The Propaganda of the Deed: Terrorism, 
Counterterrorism, and Mobilization," American Journal of Political Science 51, no. 2 (2007), 365. 
 10
recruitment of potential suicide bombers, and therefore increase the level of violence 
against Israeli targets.”26  Aaron Mannes studies targeted killing from a different 
perspective and examines religious-based terrorist organizations in Israel.  He argues that 
“there [is] a strong indication that religious terrorist groups increase their level of deadly 
violence substantially when subject to decapitation strikes.”27   
Ultimately, an examination of the literature surrounding the employment of 
targeted killings against terrorist organizations provides contradictory results.  As a 
result, it is likely that other variables interact with targeted killings to effect the increases 
or decreases in violence among terrorist organizations.   
2. Deterrence Effects of Targeted Killing 
The literature suggests that the employment of targeted killing against terrorist 
organizations produces a deterrent effect which limits terrorist activity.  For example, 
targeted killings in Gaza and the West Bank show a deterrent effect on Palestinian 
terrorist organizations.  Jaeger and Paserman conduct an empirical analysis of data on 
violence and attempted violence during the Second Intifada in Israel.  Their analysis 
reveals that “targeted killings of Palestinian leaders have a short-term deterrence or 
incapacitation effect: the overall number of Israeli fatalities, and the number of Israelis 
killed in suicide attacks fall in the first week after a targeted killing.”28  Though initially 
successful in deterring Palestinian violence, the deterrence effect for targeted killings 
appears to diminish after the first week.  David also believes targeted killings deter 
Palestinian terrorist organizations, but for a longer duration.  In his view, “there are 
skilled, capable Palestinians who do not engage in terrorist operations for fear of Israeli 
reprisals.”29   Targeted killings may also deter Palestinian commanders and the terrorist 
                                                 
26 David A. Jaeger and M. Daniele Paserman, The Shape of Things to Come? Assessing the 
Effectiveness of Suicide Attacks and Targeted Killings (Bonn, Germany: Institute for the Study of Labor, 
[2007]). 
27 Mannes, Testing the Snake Head Strategy: Does Killing or Capturing its Leaders Reduce a 
Terrorist Group's Activity?, 43. 
28 Jaeger and Paserman, The Shape of Things to Come? Assessing the Effectiveness of Suicide Attacks 
and Targeted Killings, 2–3. 
29 David, Fatal Choices: Israel's Policy of Targeted Killing, 7. 
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support network.  “Behind every suicide bomber are others who might not be as ready for 
martyrdom.”30  However, there is contradictory evidence to these claims.  An empirical 
study by Hafez and Hatfield examines the claims that targeted killings deter Palestinian 
violence.  Hafez and Hatfield’s study discovers that Israel’s defensive measures of barrier 
building and increased intelligence collection are responsible for the deterrent effect on 
Palestinian terrorists, not targeted killings.31  A second argument for the failure of 
targeted killings as an effective deterrent against Palestinian violence comes from belief 
that leaders killed in targeted killings are perceived as martyrs and inspire violent 
behavior.  Martyrdom is one of the highest honors in Palestinian society.32  The 
decapitation of terrorist leadership creates “mythologies of martyrdom” which can 
radicalize the population.33  Byman examines Hezbollah’s veneration of its martyrs and 
concludes that the creation of martyrs assists terrorist organizations in marketing the 
organization and recruiting new terrorists.34  The creation of martyrs through targeted 
killing may also encourage terrorist organizations to unite and work together against 
Israel.35  The literature argues that targeted killings are ineffective against terrorist 
organizations or create consequences which outweigh the benefits.  However, the 
literature is limited to Israel and relies on theoretical analysis rather than empirical 
evidence.   
3.  Targeted Killing Signals the State’s Determination to Fight 
Suicide bombings and terrorist attacks place a great deal of strain on the state’s 
political credibility with the population.  As a result, the political authority must respond 
to terrorist attacks and answer the population’s demand for recourse.  Targeted killings 
                                                 
30 David, Fatal Choices: Israel's Policy of Targeted Killing, 7. 
31 Hafez and Hatfield, Do Targeted Assassinations Work? A Multivariate Analysis of Israel's 
Controversial Tactic during Al-Aqsa Uprising, 374. 
32 Bloom, Palestinian Suicide Bombing: Public Support, Market Share, and Outbidding, 74. 
33 Martha Crenshaw, "How Terrorism Ends," United States Institute of Peace: Special Report (25 
May, 1999), 3, www.usip.org (accessed 14 December 2009). 
34 Byman, Do Targeted Killings Work?, 100. 
35 David, Fatal Choices: Israel's Policy of Targeted Killing, 12. 
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“satisfy domestic demands for a forceful response to terrorism.”36  Existing literature 
examines Israel’s policy of targeted killing on the Israeli population.  Bloom argues that 
“[targeted killing] showed that the government was being proactive, counteracting the 
chaos brought about by the bombings and bringing precision and order back to the 
conflict.”37  David takes this point of view a step further and states that even though 
targeted killing may have increased terrorist attacks in Israel, targeted killings are 
effective in “providing retribution and revenge for a population under siege and may, 
over the long term, help create conditions for a more secure Israel.”38  Hafez and Hatfield 
concur with the assertion that targeted killings signal the state’s determination to fight 
terrorism, but also conclude that the elimination of capable terrorist leaders does not 
impact either the number or success of terrorist attacks.39   
While targeted killings may allow the state to signal its determination to fight 
terrorism, there is little indication that this strategic signaling employed by the state 
impacts the terrorist organization’s operations.  In reality, the true impact of killing a 
terrorist leader is perceived by the general population who require some measure of 
control in a chaotic environment.  The death of a terrorist leader conveys the state’s 
strength and control to a population fearful of random terrorist attacks.   
B. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF TARGETED KILLINGS ON 
CONVENTIONAL FORCES 
One of the major criticisms of researching the effects of targeted killing on 
terrorist organizations is that the research is usually limited to the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict, and thus difficult to generalize to the wider counterterrorism fight.  However, 
targeted killings have also been employed against conventional military leaders.  During 
World War II, the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Combined Fleet, Admiral 
Isoroku Yamamoto, was killed in a targeted killing authorized by the U.S. Commander-
                                                 
36 Byman, Do Targeted Killings Work?, 102. 
37 Bloom, Palestinian Suicide Bombing: Public Support, Market Share, and Outbidding, 85. 
38 David, Fatal Choices: Israel's Policy of Targeted Killing, 2. 
39 Hafez and Hatfield, Do Targeted Assassinations Work? A Multivariate Analysis of Israel's 
Controversial Tactic during Al-Aqsa Uprising, 378–379. 
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in-Chief of the Pacific Ocean, Admiral Nimitz.  Though the outcome of the attack proved 
inconclusive in demoralizing the Japanese Navy, politicians and military commanders 
continue to employ the tactic.   
John Warden examines the importance of military and civilian leadership during 
the Persian Gulf War.  He states that “capturing or killing the state’s leader has frequently 
been decisive.”40  Warden goes on to contend that “the most critical ring is the enemy 
command structure because it is the only element of the enemy—whether a civilian at the 
seat of government or a general directing a fleet—that can make concessions.41  Though 
Warden produces a convincing argument, historical evidence may contradict his 
assertion. 
In answering this question, Stephen Hosmer examines the effectiveness of 
targeted killings on the enemy’s decision process.  He contends that targeted killings are 
usually unsuccessful in achieving the attacker’s goals.  “Experience shows that the 
demise of a targeted leader rarely produces the changes in government policy and 
practice anticipated.”42  In addition, targeted killings may not deter unwanted enemy 
activity, may create harmful unintended consequences, and sometimes fail to even kill the 
targeted leader.43  Though Warden and Hosmer find themselves on different sides of the 
targeted killing debate, both authors argue that careful study of the enemy organization 
and the environmental factors is required to determine the potential success of a targeted 
killing. 
C.  THE EFFECTIVENESS OF TARGETED KILLINGS ON 
COUNTERINSURGENCIES 
The effectiveness of targeted killing on counterinsurgency operations is rarely 
studied with more than superficial analysis.  Paul Staniland states that “killing insurgent 
                                                 
40 John A. Warden, "Employing Air Power in the Twenty-First Century," in The Future of Air Power 
in the Aftermath of the Gulf War, ed. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr. (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air 
University Press, 1992), 65. 
41 Ibid., 65. 
42 Stephen T. Hosmer, Operations Against Enemy Leaders (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2001), 19. 
43 Ibid., 19. 
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leaders can trigger disarray and even disintegration within insurgencies or at least disrupt 
their operations and organization.”44  Though targeted killings may succeed against 
insurgent groups, the operations are difficult for the counterinsurgent and in some cases; 
decentralized organizations can replace leaders quickly.45  In contrast to Staniland, 
Patrick Johnston examines the subject in greater depth.  He conducts an empirical study 
on a dataset of 168 insurgencies between 1803 and 1999.  Johnston outlines four reasons 
why leadership decapitation is effective against insurgencies: 1) killing a charismatic 
insurgent leader can break the morale of his followers; 2) eliminating radical insurgent 
leadership may place the organization under the control of more moderate leaders; 3) 
killing insurgent leaders limits the insurgent’s ability to plan and coordinate operations 
against the state; and 4) captured insurgent leaders occasionally renounce violence 
against the state and encourage their followers to surrender.46   
Johnston’s analysis of counterinsurgency operations reveals that the 
counterinsurgent is more likely to prevail when leadership decapitation is employed.  
“Decapitation raises the predicted probability of government victory to 86%, a change of 
over 46%.”47  Johnson refutes assertions that leadership decapitation increases violence 
against the state, since insurgent organizations rely on strategic calculations to plan 
attacks rather than emotional retaliatory attacks.48  Johnston also refutes claims that a 
specific ideological belief makes an insurgent organization more or less susceptible to 
leadership decapitation.  “Secessionist, communist, and religious insurgencies are all 
“causes” to which those who fight for them are committed…group members are likely 
highly committed regardless of whether or not the group abides by a specific ideology.”49   
 
 
                                                 
44 Paul Staniland, "Defeating Transnational Insurgencies: The Best Offense is a Good Fence," The 
Washington Quarterly 29, no. 1 (Winter, 2005), 27. 
45 Ibid., 27–28. 
46 Johnston, The Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation in Counterinsurgency, 9. 
47 Ibid., 27. 
48 Ibid., 7. 
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Johnston and Staniland’s analysis of insurgencies reveal that targeted killing of insurgent 
leadership increases the counterinsurgent’s chances of successfully defeating the 
insurgency. 
D. EFFECTIVENESS OF TARGETED INCARCERATIONS ON 
LEADERSHIP DECAPITATION 
An examination of existing literature on leadership decapitation reveals an 
overwhelming majority of authors who prefer targeted incarcerations over targeted 
killings.  Mannes states that “few argue against the method of arrest and trial of terrorist 
leaders.”50  Though targeted killings permanently eliminate a leader, arresting a leader 
possesses distinct advantages.  Arresting terrorist or insurgent leadership may prevent a 
subordinate from stepping into the leadership position.  “An imprisoned religious leader 
may continue to be a source of authority that prevents a new leader from taking 
charge.”51  The capture of high-value individuals also encourages news headlines, 
engenders popular support, and provides the state with a public relations victory.52  
Arresting leaders allows security forces to “interrogate the suspect and learn about future 
plots and additional operatives, who can then be arrested too.”53  Kaplan examines the 
impact of arrests on suicide bombings in Israel.  “Arresting suspected terrorists appears to 
reduce suicide bombings without inducing the recruitment of additional terrorists.”54  
Though arresting suspected terrorist and insurgent leaders appears beneficial, there are 
definite risks to the counterinsurgent or counterterrorism force executing the capture.  
The potential risks to government forces executing capture operations often overwhelm 
the benefits of arresting a high value target (HVI) and necessitate a targeted killing 
operation. 
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E. TARGETED KILLING VERSUS TARGETED INCARCERATIONS 
Weighing the advantages and disadvantages of targeted killing against targeted 
incarceration is often difficult.  Targeted killings may decrease the risk to government 
forces, but create unintended consequences.  Edward Kaplan argues that the benefits of 
arresting leaders outweigh the risks to government forces.  “Preventative arrests, as 
opposed to the targeted killing of suspected terrorists, are responsible for the dramatic 
reduction in suicide bombings inside Israel since March 2002.”55  Byman echoes this 
assertion by stating that “arresting terrorists, when possible, is a much better course.”56  
Jordan also believes the advantages of arresting leaders outweigh the advantages of 
killing a terrorist leader.  Her empirical analysis of counter terrorism operations executed 
by the Israeli Government against Palestinian terrorist organizations shows that “of the 
organizations that fell apart, 63.9% were from arrests, while 36.11% were from the death 
of the leadership.”57  Johnston acknowledges the existing counterterrorism literature, but 
his empirical analysis of counterinsurgencies reveals that both capturing and killing 
insurgent leadership are “positive predictors of counterinsurgency victory.”58 
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III. EXAMINING A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON LEADERSHIP 
DECAPITATION 
The existing literature provides a framework to build additional arguments and 
conduct additional research.  Johnston’s and Jordan’s works on leadership decapitation 
form the basis for this thesis’s further examination of the effectiveness of targeted killing 
and targeted incarceration.  Johnston argues that leadership decapitation through the 
killing or capturing of insurgent leadership is not only effective, but plays an integral role 
in defeating an insurgent organization.  He also states that the killing or incarceration of 
insurgent leaders is immaterial.  Jordan concludes that removing second tier leadership 
from a terrorist organization causes the group to collapse.  These two arguments, in 
cooperation with the greater body of literature surrounding the debate over whether 
targeted killings increases or decreases insurgent violence help to inform the theory 
proposed in this thesis.  
The framework provided by the existing literature shows that conditions exist 
when targeted killings and targeted incarceration are effective in reducing insurgent 
violence.  The creation of a 2x2 matrix assists in outlining the choices the state and the 
insurgent leadership face (see Figure 1).  The state, having made the determination to 
target the insurgent leader must decide to either pursue a strategy of targeted killing (K) 
or targeted incarceration (I).  On the other hand, the insurgency’s leadership must 
determine whether it is in the organizations best interest to name a successor (S) or to not 
name a successor (N).  The interaction of these two decisions will assist in determining 
the best outcome for each of the combatants. 












Figure 1.   2x2 Matrix outlining the combatant’s choices 
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The state possesses a wide array of choices in its interaction with an insurgent 
leader.  The first decision is whether or not to target the insurgent leader.  Historical 
evidence shows that insurgencies rarely if ever collapse on their own.  Therefore, the 
state must target insurgent leaders through some kinetic or non-kinetic engagement.  
Non-kinetic engagements such as negotiations, information operations, strategic 
communication, or psychological operations are an ongoing process and do not exist in 
isolation from kinetic operations such as killing or capturing insurgent leaders.  In fact 
kinetic operations and non-kinetic operations often possess reinforcing effects on the 
targeted insurgent leader.  This thesis examines the state’s decision to target an insurgent 
leader through either targeted killing or targeted incarceration with the understanding that 
the state is simultaneously engaging the insurgent leader with non-kinetic options as well. 
Insurgent leaders also possess a myriad of choices in determining their 
organization’s command structure and control mechanisms.  Hierarchical organizations 
possess distinct qualities which separate them from flat or decentralized organizations.  
Purely hierarchical organizations possess a definite chain of command to control the 
organization’s operations, while purely flat organizations possess no identifiable 
leadership entities.  Most insurgent organizations exist somewhere between these two 
poles on the leadership structure scale.  Therefore, insurgent leaders must determine how 
far along this organizational spectrum they want their organization to move.  With a 
command and control framework in place, insurgent leaders must determine their second-
in-command or successor.  Insurgent leaders recognize that the state attempts to maintain 
order and rule of law in the country.  As a result, insurgent leaders understand that the 
state is actively working to eliminate insurgent leadership though either incarceration or 
targeted killing.  Insurgent leaders must make preparations for their possible elimination.  
Naming a successor eliminates possible power struggles, but allows the state to target the 
successor as well as the leader.  Therefore, insurgent leaders must make the difficult 
decision of naming a successor or not naming a successor.   
The effectiveness of targeted killings and targeted incarcerations is determined by 
the interaction of the two independent variables and the measurement of change in the 
dependent variable (see Figure 2).  The first independent variable is the 
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counterinsurgency strategy employed by the government’s forces against the 
insurgency’s leadership and is defined through the targeted killing or targeted 
incarceration of insurgent leaders.  The second independent variable is the leadership 
succession strategy employed by the current leader of an insurgent force and is defined 
through the current leader naming a successor or not naming a successor.  The dependent 
variable observed is insurgent activity which is measured by either the increase or 
decrease in insurgent activity five years after the kill/capture operation.   
A. TESTING THE RESEARCH DESIGN 
Hypotheses are constructed and then tested with qualitative analysis of case 
studies.  The most effective method to test the proposed hypotheses is through structured-
focused comparison.  Structured-focused comparison provides the method to isolate the 
targeted variable across multiple case studies and compare the case studies in a semi-
controlled environment.  It is also important to analyze the process-tracing in the cases.  
Process tracing allows the researcher to follow the causal mechanisms and study the inner 
workings of the process as the independent variables interact to cause changes in the 
dependent variable.   
When an insurgent leader is removed through either death or incarceration, the 
second-in-command will fill the leadership void and lead the organization.59  The 
appointment of this successor prior to the removal of the leader is important to conferring 
the legitimacy to lead on the successor.60  With legitimacy, the successor can continue 
the ideological struggle against the state and carry on the military fight initiated by the 
killed or incarcerated leader.  This seamless transfer of power should increase or maintain 
violence directed at the state.  However, when an insurgent leader is removed from an 
organization prior to selecting a successor, infighting and power struggles are likely to 
emerge as leaders vie for the legitimacy to lead the insurgent organization.61  These 
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power struggles result in a loss of operational momentum and a misdirection of 
ideological objectives.  If there is not a clear successor to the eliminated leader, then the 
insurgent organization will collapse, fragment, or suffer a loss in operational capability.62  
If positioned correctly, the state can capitalize on this loss of capability and further 
degrade the insurgent organization.  The following hypotheses are proposed to test this 
research question. 
H1:  If targeted killings are executed against leaders of insurgencies with no apparent 
successor, then insurgent violence should decrease after their leader is killed. 
Insurgent organizations rely heavily on the knowledge, skill, and leadership 
qualities of their leaders to combat the superior force applied by the state.63  Without 
quality leaders, the insurgent organization succumbs to the state’s power.  Therefore, 
when an insurgent leader is eliminated through targeted killing and a clear successor is 
not appointed, the insurgent organization is likely to experience a decrease in operational 
capability due to infighting and internal struggles for power.  This infighting distracts the 
organization from its military goals and limits the quality and quantity of insurgent 
attacks of the state.  When a new leader finally emerges from the turmoil, it is unlikely 
that the new leader possesses the same legitimacy to lead the organization as the former 
leader.  Some portion of the organization is likely to reject the new leader and either 
fragment the organization into a new splinter organization or quite the struggle 
altogether.  As a result, the death of an insurgent leader without a clear successor is likely 
to cause a decrease in insurgent violence directed at the state. 
H2:  If targeted incarcerations are executed against insurgent leaders without a clear 
successor then insurgent violence should decrease following the arrest of the leader. 
Similarly to hypothesis H1, the arrest of an insurgent leader without a clear 
successor is likely to decrease insurgent violence.  When the leader is incarcerated 
without appointing a successor, infighting and power struggles are likely to emerge.  If 
the leader cannot communicate the choice of a successor from prison, then the infighting 
is likely to continue.  When a new leader emerges, it is likely that some portion of the 
                                                 
62 Jordan, Leadership Decapitation of Terrorist Organizations, 22. 
63 David, Fatal Choices: Israel's Policy of Targeted Killing, 7. 
 21
insurgent organization will maintain an affinity for the incarcerated leader and cling to 
the old ideology and methodology.  Any changes or adjustments counter to the 
incarcerated leader’s directives are likely to be perceived as illegitimate.  This power 
struggle between the incarcerated leader and the new leader of the organization is likely 
to fracture the organization and diminish the operational effectiveness against the state.  
Additionally, the lack of a legitimate successor to replace the incarcerated leader will 
prevent the leader from becoming a martyr and a uniting factor within the insurgent 
organization.  As a result, the targeted incarceration of an insurgent leader should reduce 
the amount of violence directed at the state. 
H3: If targeted killings are executed against insurgent groups with a clear successor to 
the leader, then violence will increase or remain constant. 
The death of an insurgent leader is a critical loss for an insurgent organization, 
even when a clear successor has been appointed.  However, an insurgent organization is 
better able to cope with the loss and quickly rebound if a legitimate successor is able to 
assume command of the organization.  An appointed successor is likely to possess many 
of the charismatic leadership abilities, knowledge, and ideological vision that the 
assassinated leader possessed.  As a result, the successor should transition to power 
quickly with only a minimal lull in military operations against the state.64  A legitimate 
successor is also capable of exploiting the assassination to draw upon images of 
martyrdom.  As the assassinated leader is perceived as a martyr, the insurgent 
organization will unite around their fallen leader and coalesce into a more dangerous 
entity.65  The targeted killing of an insurgent leader with a clear successor will increase 
violence directed at the state due to the transfer of legitimacy which prevents a lull in 
insurgent capability and the creation of a martyr narrative which unites and inspires the 
organization. 
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H4:  If targeted incarcerations are executed against insurgent leaders with a clear 
successor, then insurgent violence should increase or remain constant following the 
arrest of the leader. 
Many scholars argue that targeted incarceration of leaders decreases violence.66  
However, when an insurgent leader is incarcerated and a clear successor remains to 
assume command of the organization, violence should actually remain the same or 
increase.  The presence of a legitimately appointed successor prevents infighting, 
ideological conflict, and delays in military operations against the state.  Additionally, 
because the successor was selected by the incarcerated leader prior to his capture, the 
successor possesses the legitimacy to lead the insurgent organization without a conflict of 
legitimacy or power struggle with the incarcerated leader.  The successor is also able to 
create a martyr narrative surrounding the incarcerated leader.67  Perceived as a martyr 
languishing in prison for the cause, the ideological leader inspires the insurgent 
organization to increased unity.  The unity of the insurgent organization increases the 
lethality, recruitment, and the frequency of attacks on the state. 
These hypotheses are tested through the examination of four illustrative case 
studies.  The examination of these four insurgent organizations with similar command 
and control structures and similar charismatic leaders provides a measure of control 
during the experiment.  As the government’s strategy of killing or incarcerating insurgent 
leaders is varied against the insurgent’s strategy of naming a successor or not naming a 
successor, the variation of the dependent variable is measured.  The measurement of 
insurgent violence five years after the government either kills or incarcerates an insurgent 
leader provides a method of determining the effectiveness of the government’s strategy.  
In this thesis, four case studies are examined to illustrate the interaction between the 
independent variables (see Table 3).  In the first case study, the deaths of Pedro Joaquin 
Chamorro and Carlos Fonseca in Nicaragua are examined to illustrate the failure of 
killing insurgent leaders who possess a clear successor.  The incarceration of Ahmed Ben 
Bella in Algeria exemplifies the failure of a government strategy of incarcerating 
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insurgent leaders with a clear successor.  In Israel, the death of Fathi Shikaki shows the 
successful employment of targeted killing against an insurgent leader with no clear 
successor.  Finally, the incarceration of Abimael Guzman in Peru shows the successful 
employment of a strategy of targeted incarceration against an insurgent leader with no 
clear successor.  The examination and discussion of these four case studies should 
provide clarity to assist governments in determining the proper strategy to employ to 
defeat insurgent organizations.   
Independent variable #1 Independent Variable #2 Dependent Variable 
Counter Insurgency 
Strategy 
Insurgent Leadership Succession 
Strategy 
Insurgent Activity 
     -Targeted Killing      -Named Successor      -Activity Increases 
     -Targeted Killing      -No Named Successor      -Activity Decreases 
     -Targeted Incarceration      -Named Successor      -Activity Increases 
     -Targeted Incarceration      -No Named Successor      -Activity Decreases 
Figure 2.   Independent and Dependent Variables 
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IV. CASE STUDIES 
A. TARGETED KILLING WITH A NAMED SUCCESSOR: CARLOS 
FONSECA AMADOR AND PEDRO JOAQUÍN CHAMORRO 
Carlos Fonseca Amador and Pedro Joaquín Chamorro represent the most visible 
and inspirational leaders of the revolution against the Somoza regime in Nicaragua.  
Drawing upon the nationalist and anti-colonial ideology of General Augusto César 
Sandino and Marxist philosophy, Fonseca and Chamorro galvanized the Nicaraguan 
population and incited widespread popular revolt.  Fonseca founded the Frente 
Sandinista de Liberacíon Nacional (FSLN) in 1961 to overthrow Nicaragua’s dictatorial 
regime and institute sweeping social reforms in Nicaragua.  Similarly, Chamorro founded 
the Democratic Liberation Union (UDEL) in 1974 as a means of inspiring popular unrest 
within the country and removing the corrupt Nicaraguan government.  Despite the 
backing of the United States the Nicaraguan government of Anastasio Somoza Debayle 
succumbed to the overwhelming popular discontent fostered by the UDEL and constant 
guerrilla attacks waged by the FSLN.  In an attempt to maintain power, Somoza 
employed the National Guard, Nicaragua’s military force responsible for law and order, 
as his private army and brutally repressed the Nicaraguan working class and the 
Sandinista rebels.  With popular support mounting against his regime, Somoza attempted 
to quell the uprising by employing a strategy of targeted killing against Fonseca and 
Chamorro.  Though successful in killing both Fonseca and Chamorro, Somoza did not 
foresee the unifying effect the killings would produce within the population.  Ultimately, 
the disparate revolutionary organizations coalesced to form the National Patriotic Front 
(FPN) and overthrew Somoza in July 1979. 
1. Origins of the Insurgency 
Nicaragua has a long history of civil strife and government corruption.  Following 
the country’s independence from Spain in the 1820s, a small number of wealthy families 
ruled Nicaragua.  Frequent armed conflict between the families led to political and 
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economic instability which ultimately forced the United States to intervene.  From 1912 
to 1925, U.S. Marines stationed in Nicaragua maintained peace in the country and 
installed a pro-U.S. conservative government.68  The United States organized and trained 
the National Guard to maintain law and order in the country and installed Anastasio 
Somoza Garcia as the new leader of the military force.  In 1925, the U.S. Marines 
withdrew from Nicaragua but quickly returned due to the outbreak of civil war in 1926.  
General Augusto César Sandino, one of the revolutionary leaders, refused to surrender 
and continued to fight until 1933 when the economic strains of the Great Depression 
forced the United States to withdraw from Nicaragua.69  Sandino, a staunch nationalist 
and anti-colonialist, inspired the Nicaraguan population and built a substantial following.  
Fearing Sandino’s rising power, Anastasio Somoza Garcia kidnapped and executed 
Sandino in 1934.70  With his power secure, Anastasio Somoza Garcia used the National 
Guard to seize power in 1936.  The Somoza family created a virtual dictatorship in the 
country until overthrown in 1979.  Anastasio Somoza Garcia was assassinated in 1956 
and his son Luis Somoza Debayle assumed control of Nicaragua until he died of natural 
causes in 1967.  Following the death of Luis Somoza Debayle, Anastasio Somoza 
Debayle, the West Point educated son of Anastasio Somoza Garcia, assumed control of 
Nicaragua until 1979 when he was overthrown by the FSLN.   
2. Insurgent Leadership 
The founder and leader of the FSLN, Carlos Fonseca Amador, was born in 
Matagalpa, Nicaragua in 1936.  He was the illegitimate son of a poor single mother who 
worked as a cook.71  While in high school, Fonseca was attracted to Marxist ideologies 
and later joined the Nicaraguan Socialist Party while attending the National Autonomous 
University.72  Following the assassination of Anastasio Somoza Garcia, Fonseca was 
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arrested in a massive crackdown on Nicaraguan dissidents by the National Guard and 
imprisoned.  Released from prison in 1957, Fonseca was selected by the Nicaraguan 
Socialist Party to attend the Sixth Youth and Student Festival in the Soviet Union.73  
Upon his return from Moscow, Fonseca expressed dissatisfaction with the Nicaraguan 
Socialist Party’s lack of support for armed revolt.  In 1959, he left the Socialist Party and 
joined the Sandinist guerrilla campaign.74  Fonseca was wounded in combat against the 
National Guard and fled to Central America and later Cuba where he met Che Guevara.75  
During his meeting with Che Guevara, Fonseca adopted Guevara’s foco theory of 
revolution which emphasized a focused, rural-based, popular movement as a means of 
waging a low-intensity guerrilla war against the state.76  Fonseca was inspired to 
transplant this new philosophy to Nicaragua.  “In July 1962 Carlos Fonseca Amador, 
together with Silvio Mayorga and Tomás Borge, founded Frente Sandinista de 
Liberacíon Nacional (FSLN). Their aim was to realize in Nicaragua what the 26th of July 
Movement had achieved in Cuba.”77  Impatient to begin an armed revolt against the 
Somoza regime, Fonseca established the FSLN’s first guerrilla cell in the Coco and 
Bokay River regions in 1963.78  In 1967, Fonseca established his second cell in the 
Pancasan region.79  Without political preparation of the regions, both guerrilla cells were 
crushed by the National Guard and the FSLN was forced to abandon the foco theory of 
revolution.  From 1967 until 1974, the FSLN abandoned military action against the 
Somoza regime, reevaluated its strategy, and gathered recruits for a more coordinated 
military effort which included a popular uprising.   
The popular uprising the FSLN required to reinitiate military actions against the 
Somoza regime was provided by Pedro Joaquín Chamorro.  Chamorro was born into a 
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wealthy family from the city of Granada in 1924.  The Chamorro family owned the La 
Prensa newspaper in Managua and inspired Chamorro to learn the newspaper business in 
school.  Chamorro studied at the Central University of Managua where he was arrested 
several times for protesting against the Somoza regime.80  Upon graduation, Chamorro 
went the National Autonomous University in Mexico to study law.  While in Mexico, 
Chamorro learned more advanced techniques in newspaper publishing and upon his 
return to Nicaragua in 1948 he took over the direction of La Prensa.  Imbued with more 
radical ideas than his father, Chamorro published articles critical of the Somoza regime 
and founded the Union of Popular Action (UNAP) to inspire social revolution and the 
overthrow of Somoza.81  Chamorro was imprisoned in 1954 after a failed attempt to 
overthrow the Somoza regime and sentenced to two year in prison.  Shortly after being 
released in 1956, Chamorro was once again arrested after the assassination of Anastasio 
Somoza Garcia.  Chamorro was tortured into confessing knowledge of the attack and was 
sentenced to six months in jail and forty months of house arrest in San Carlos del Rio on 
the Costa Rican border.82  Chamorro escaped from house arrest and lived in exile in 
Costa Rica for two years.  While in exile, Chamorro organized the Nicaraguan resistance 
movement and worked to procure weapons and support from Cuba and Venezuela.83  In 
1959, Chamorro raised a 110-man guerrilla force and flew back to Nicaragua to begin a 
guerrilla campaign and popular uprising against the Somoza regime.84  Due to poor 
planning and the premature nature of the operation, the National Guard crushed the 
uprising quickly.  Chamorro was captured and sentenced to nine years in prison for 
treason.  However, as part of a general amnesty, Chamorro was released in 1960.85  From  
 
 
                                                 
80 Patricia Taylor Edmisten, Nicaragua Divided: La Prensa and the Chamorro Legacy (Pensacola: 
University of West Florida Press, 1990), 15. 
81 Ibid., 20. 
82 Ibid., 27. 
83 Ibid., 33. 
84 Ibid., 34. 
85 Ibid., 43. 
 29
1960 until 1974, Chamorro continued to publish La Prensa and criticize the Somoza 
regime, but limited his radical activities until conditions for a popular uprising emerged 
in Nicaragua.   
3. Insurgent Actions 
The earthquake that struck Nicaragua in 1972 marked the beginning of the 
popular uprising against the Somoza regime.  Nicaragua’s capital city, Managua, was 
leveled in the quake and over 10,000 people were killed.  “Amidst the chaos, the 
[National] Guard disintegrated into a collection of mobs intent on looting what remained 
of downtown Managua.”86  In response to the disaster and societal breakdown, the 
international community pledged millions of dollars in aid to rebuild the country.  The 
majority of the aid was siphoned off into Anastasio Somoza Debayle’s personal accounts 
and never distributed to the population.87  The social discontent surrounding the 
mishandling of the 1972 earthquake encouraged young Catholic priests, inspired by 
liberation theology, to encourage the poor population to demand fair wages, education 
opportunities, medical care, and equal rights.88  The beginnings of social unrest in 
Nicaragua reawakened the FSLN.  Though still rebuilding, the FSLN represented the 
most credible subversive threat to the government of Nicaragua.89  From 1972 to 1974, 
the FSLN prepared for military action against the Somoza regime and financed its 
preparations through kidnappings and small-unit raids on government targets.90  “On 
December 27, 1974, a group of thirteen armed Sandinistas seized several politically 
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prominent hostages at the home of a wealthy cotton exporter.”91  The hostages were 
traded for eighteen FSLN prisoners, $5 million dollars, and safe passage to Cuba.92  
Somoza responded to the attack by declaring a state of emergency in Nicaragua which 
imposed martial law and censorship of the press.  As the Somoza regime’s heavy handed 
tactics became more widespread, middle and upper class resistance organizations began 
to form.  Alfonso Robelo, a wealth businessman formed the Nicaraguan Democratic 
Movement (MDN) to call for the removal of Anastasio Somoza Debayle and the 
incorporation of the FSLN into the future government.93  Monseigneur Miguel Obando y 
Bravo, the Archbishop of Managua, formed the Frente Amplio de Oposición (FAO) to 
emphasize the Catholic Church’s support for the removal of Somoza.94  Though multiple 
opposition organizations emerged in the early 1970s to call for the removal of the 
Somoza regime, ideological and class divisions prevented the organizations from 
effectively threatening the government.  Pedro Joaquín Chamorro found the common 
ground between the disparate organizations and organized a united opposition against the 
government.  “In 1974 [Chamorro] brought together all of the opposition—the dissident 
Liberals, Conservatives, Christian Socialists, intellectuals, and labor leaders—under the 
banner of the Democratic Union of Liberation (UDEL).”95   
While Chamorro united political opposition to the government of Nicaragua 
through the UDEL, Carlos Fonseca and the FSLN struggled to find unity within the 
military resistance.  In 1975, the FSLN fragmented into three factions: the Prolonged 
People’s War led by Tomás Borge and Henry Ruiz who believed resistance began in the 
rural population; the Proletarios led by Jaime Wheelock who believed that resistance 
centered in the urban population; and the Terceristas led by Daniel and Humberto Ortega 
who de-emphasized the organizations Marxist ideology in favor of social reform.96  With 
the FSLN fracturing, Anastasio Somoza Debayle attempted to completely collapse the 
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resistance through the elimination of the FSLN’s key leadership.  Carlos Fonseca 
Amador was the central leader of the FSLN.97  On 8 November 1976, the National Guard 
tracked Fonseca into the Zelaya region and killed him.  The death of Fonseca failed to 
collapse the FSLN.  Prior to Fonseca’s death, Daniel Ortega, the leader of the Terceristas 
faction of the FSLN, had emerged as the clear successor to Carlos Fonseca.98  Though the 
FSLN did not unite under Ortega until 1978, Ortega’s position as the most successful 
FSLN military commander, leader of the Terceristas faction, and ideological emphasis on 
social reform provided the legitimacy Ortega required to succeed Carlos Fonseca as the 
leader of the FSLN.99  Upon Fonseca’s death, Daniel Ortega immediately succeeded 
Fonseca and continued efforts to reunify the FSLN.  With mounting pressure from the 
United States over human rights abuses, the fracturing of the FSLN, and the death of 
Fonseca, Anastasio Somoza Debayle rescinded the state of emergency declaration in 
September 1977.100  The lifting of the repressive state of emergency resulted in a rapid 
continuation of FSLN military attacks and popular uprisings.  “The FSLN reappeared in 
October 1977, operating with more modern weapons and carrying out hit-and-run raids 
throughout the country.”101  The Terceristas continued to produce the most effective 
attacks on the National Guard and the faction slowly gained the leadership of the FSLN.  
With Daniel Ortega and the Terceristas in control, the FSLN attacked the National Guard 
barracks in Ocotal, Masaya, and San Carlos in October 1977.102  Though the attacks were 
a failure, the show of military resistance galvanized support for the FSLN and 
encouraged recruitment.   
Pedro Joaquín Chamorro also took advantage of the loosening of press censorship 
and increased his attacks on the Somoza regime in La Prensa.  Through the UDEL and 
control of La Prensa, Chamorro wielded a great deal of power and posed a threat to 
Somoza’s authority.  “Chamorro was one of the most respected political moderates in the 
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country and was thought the most likely to hold a key position in any new government 
should Somoza step down or be forced to leave.”103  To maintain power, Somoza once 
again employed targeted killing in an attempt to collapse the resistance movement.  On 
10 January 1978, Chamorro was shot to death after leaving church and was succeeded by 
Rafael Córdova Rivas as the leader of the UDEL.104  Rivas represented several high 
profile FSLN leaders in court and was a close personal friend of Chamorro.  “The 
assassination of Chamorro was the spark that lit the prairie fire.  The resulting outrage 
coalesced all opposition to the regime into a single movement.  Henceforth there would 
be a continual succession of mass demonstrations, general strikes, and partial 
insurrections.”105  An eighty-five percent effective general strike from January to 
February 1978 crippled Nicaragua’s economy.106  A massive popular uprising in 
Monimbo in February 1978 and FSLN attacks on National Guard outposts in Rivas and 
Granada stretched the resources of the National Guard.  With the country on the brink of 
chaos, the FSLN launched their most sophisticated attack of the insurgency.  On August 
22, 1978, an FSLN unit seized the National Palace and took more than 1,500 people 
hostage, including most of the government’s officials.”107  In exchange for the release of 
the hostages, the FSLN demanded the release of over fifty FSLN prisoners, $500,000 
dollars, and safe passage out of the country.  Inspired by the seizure of the National 
Palace, youth around the country began to openly revolt against the Somoza regime.  
Somoza reimposed martial law and brutally suppressed the uprisings.  Many of the youth 
fled to the Sandinista camps and joined the FSLN.  As Nicaragua descended further into 
chaos, Venezuela, Panama, Costa Rica, and Cuba began to openly support the 
insurgency, while the United States slowly removed its support from the Somoza regime.  
The Somoza regime began to crack under the internal and international pressure and in 
May 1979, the FSLN launched its final offensive against the Nicaraguan government.108  
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With the FSLN in control of numerous major cities and threatening Managua, Somoza 
ordered the bombing of all FSLN-held cities in an attempt to break the insurgency.  News 
footage of the heavy-handed tactics employed to quell the uprising turned international 
public opinion against Somoza and his position became untenable. 
4. Outcome of the Insurgency 
With Nicaragua in complete chaos, Somoza sought international assistance to 
regain control of the country.  The widespread human rights abuses and massive brutality 
employed by Somoza and the National Guard eliminated any chance of international aid.  
President Carter ordered Somoza to step down as president.  The Organization of 
American States voted seventeen to two to support Somoza’s resignation.109  Finally, on 
13 July 1979, Somoza and his top National Guard officers fled to Guatemala.110  Without 
the country’s leadership, the National Guard collapsed and the FSLN occupied Managua 
on 19 July 1979.  After the Somoza regime fell, “the FSLN joined with other anti-
Somoza groups to establish a revolutionary executive committee of five persons to run 
the country until elections were held.”111  Though the Somoza family’s property and 
assets were reallocated to the people, Somoza managed to flee Nicaragua with the 
country’s liquid assets.  While in exile in Paraguay, Somoza was assassinated by the 
Sandinistas in 1980.  Though Anastasio Somoza Debayle successfully eliminated two of 
the Nicaraguan insurgency’s most important leaders, his strategy of targeted killing failed 
to collapse the insurgency and failed to prevent either the FSLN or UDEL from achieving 
their political objectives. 
5. Analysis 
Anastasio Somoza Debayle believed that the elimination of the key insurgent 
leaders was critical to the collapse of the insurgency.  Carlos Fonseca Amador and the 
FSLN represented the greatest military threat to the Somoza regime.  Though Fonseca’s 
                                                 
109 DeFronzo, Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements, 246. 
110 Walker, The Economic and Political Background, 165. 
111 DeFronzo, Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements, 247. 
 34
attacks against the National Guard failed to produce substantial military outcomes, the 
attacks did succeed in galvanizing popular support and maintaining pressure on the 
Somoza regime.  As the clear leader of the FSLN, Fonseca represented the most lucrative 
target for the Somoza regime’s attempt at leadership decapitation.  However, Somoza 
failed to understand an important detail imbedded within the structure of the FSLN’s 
leadership network.  The FSLN was a guerrilla army that maintained a loose hierarchical 
structure of national, regional, and cell commanders to guard against the loss of any one 
leader.  This structure allowed the FSLN to view Daniel Ortega, the most successful 
FSLN military commander and ideological leader as the legitimate successor in the event 
of Fonseca’s capture or death.  In 1976, Daniel Ortega and the Terceristas faction were 
gaining power and legitimacy rapidly within the FSLN.  As a result, Daniel Ortega 
possessed the legitimacy to step forward as Fonseca’s clear successor and direct the 
FSLN’s military and political operations.  With a clear successor, the death of Carlos 
Fonseca Amador served only to unite the FSLN, enflame popular discontent, and 
legitimize Daniel Ortega’s assumption of power. 
Though the killing of Carlos Fonseca Amador failed to achieve the collapse of the 
insurgency, Anastasio Somoza Debayle once again attempted a strategy of targeted 
killing in 1978 with the murder of Pedro Joaquín Chamorro.  Chamorro represented a 
clear challenge to Somoza’s power and authority in Nicaragua.  La Prensa regularly 
published articles critical of the regime and exposed government corruption.  Chamorro 
was exceptionally successful at instigating popular uprisings and revolts throughout the 
country due to his popular appeal.  Chamorro successfully procured weapons and 
financial support from foreign donors to support armed struggle against the regime.  
Finally, Chamorro’s popular appeal established him as the clear leader to assume the 
presidency in the event Somoza left office.  Though Somoza possessed numerous reasons 
to fear Chamorro’s power and eliminate a rival, Somoza failed, once again, to understand 
the dynamics of the UDEL or the personal preparation of Chamorro.  As an umbrella 
organization designed to synchronize the efforts of multiple smaller movements, the 
UDEL elected its leadership.  Chamorro was the clear and legitimate leader of the UDEL 
and directed a semi-hierarchical chain of command to conduct operations against 
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Somoza.  In addition, Chamorro fought the insurgency against Somoza for over forty 
years and understood the dangers of leadership.  Chamorro spoke of death regularly with 
his wife and subordinates and took measures to guard his family, his newspaper, and the 
UDEL from disruption in the event of his murder.112  Chamorro appointed successors to 
carry on his ideology.  Pablo Antonio Cuadra succeeded Chamorro as the publisher of La 
Prensa, and Rafael Córdova Rivas succeeded Chamorro as the leader of the UDEL.  
Chamorro’s preparations established the legitimacy of his successors and prevented the 
collapse of the UDEL. 
Anastasio Somoza Debayle’s strategy of targeted killing proved a complete 
failure.  As argued by Byman and Bueno de Mesquita, the assassinations of Carlos 
Fonseca Amador and Pedro Joaquín Chamorro only united the resistance organizations, 
galvanized support for armed struggle, and encouraged popular uprisings against the 
Somoza regime.  As noted by Bloom, the elevation of Fonseca and Chamorro as martyrs 
increased the violence against the Somoza regime and hastened the regime’s downfall.  
Fonseca and Chamorro’s successors possessed not only the skill to lead the organizations, 
but also the legitimacy to succeed clear leaders of the Nicaraguan resistance. 
The counterfactuals surrounding the Nicaraguan revolution are interesting to 
examine.  It is possible that the Somoza regime could have averted disaster by 
incarcerating Fonseca and Chamorro, simply continuing to suppress the insurgency 
without eliminating key leaders, or killing Fonseca and Chamorro before their clear 
successor emerged.  Though both Fonseca and Chamorro were imprisoned multiple 
times, the insurgency never escalated as a result of their incarceration.  It is likely that the 
FSLN would have remained fragmented had the assassination of Fonseca not catalyzed 
the three disparate factions.  It is also likely that the Somoza regime could have simply 
maintained steady pressure on the insurgency.  Without the heavy-handed repression of 
the population, the Nicaraguan population would not have risen up against Somoza and 
the United States would not have withdrawn its support from the anti-communist regime.  
Had the Somoza regime killed Fonseca and Chamorro in the insurgency’s infancy, before 
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a hierarchical structure or clear successors emerged within the organization, it is possible 
that the FSLN would have collapsed or never fully formed.  
B. TARGETED INCARCERATION WITH A NAMED SUCCESSOR: 
AHMED BEN BELLA 
Ahmed Ben Bella, an Algerian Non-Commission Officer in the French Army, 
organized the Front Libération Nationale (FLN) in 1954 to combat the French oppression 
of the Muslim majority in Algeria and eliminate France’s colonial holdings in Algeria.  
Ben Bella worked closely with the Egyptian, Moroccan, and Tunisian governments to 
arm and finance the insurgency in Algeria.  Due to Ben Bella’s stature as an insurgent 
leader as well as his role as the key resource conduit from neighboring Arab states, the 
French intelligence service attempted to kill Ben Bella twice, and finally captured him in 
1956.  The French believed the removal of Ben Bella would cutoff critical supplies, 
eliminate a charismatic leader, and ultimately cause the collapse of the Algerian 
resistance.  In reality, the removal of Ben Bella united the disparate resistance groups in 
Algeria, encouraged additional support for the insurgency, and Ben Bella remained an 
inspirational symbol to the Algerian insurgents.  In the end, France was compelled to 
recognize the independence and self-determination of Algeria and Ben Bella was elected 
the country’s first president. 
1. Origins of the Insurgency 
France annexed Algeria in 1830 and demanded allegiance from the Algerian 
Muslim population.  “France asserted that Algeria was an extension of French national 
territory and that its native born inhabitants were national subjects.”113  In response to 
French occupation and discrimination, a nationalist and anti-settler movement emerged 
during the 1920s in North Africa and Algeria which ultimately resulted in the opening of 
hostilities in the French-Algerian War.  The Algerian nationalist movement began in 
1925 with the creation of Étoile Nord-Africaine (ENA) by Messali Hadj.114  Messali 
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Hadj was a member of the French Communist Party and a staunch pacifist who believed 
in the elimination of French colonial power in Algeria through peaceful means and the 
full independence of the country.  In 1937, the ENA was dissolved by French authorities 
in Algeria and Messali Hadj was arrested.  Several months later, Messali Hadj founded 
the Parti du people Algérien (PPA), which was outlawed quickly by the French 
authorities and Messali Hadj was placed under house arrest.115  Though underground, the 
PPA continued to work towards Algerian independence through peaceful methods until 
1945.  On 8 May 1945, public demonstrations for Algerian nationalism in Sétif turned 
violent as French forces killed or injured thousands of Algerian protestors.116  This 
overreaction by French forces hardened resistance to French colonization and created 
splinter organizations which sought to overthrow the French through violence.  In 1946, 
Messali Hadj organized the Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Liberées Démocratiques 
(MTLD) which sought an independent Algeria through legal means.  “While the MTLD 
operated on a legal basis to pursue independence primarily as an Islamic and Arab 
movement, the PPA unofficially continued its course underground and created the 
Organisation Spéciale (OS) as a paramilitary resistance organization.”117  As the more 
militant faction of the MTLD gained power within the organization, Messali Hadj began 
to disengage; continuing to seek a peaceful means to achieve independence.  As the non-
violent factions faded in Algeria, Ahmed Ben Bella emerged as the most notable 
insurgent leader of the Algerian resistance.   
2. Insurgent Leadership 
Ahmed Ben Bella was born on 25 December 1916 in the town of Marnia in the 
Oran district of Algeria.118  The Muslim population of Algeria received harsh treatment 
and little possibility of economic advancement due to the discriminatory policies of the 
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one million French colons who exercised authority in Algeria.  Despite open 
discrimination against the Muslim Algerians, Ben Bella attended primary school in 
Marnia and secondary school in the town of Tlemcen.119  While in school, Ben Bella was 
inspired by the nationalist and anti-settler movements in Algeria due to the daily 
repression of the Algerian Arabs.  He also experienced the widespread racial 
discrimination which the French colons used to oppress the Muslim population.120  He 
left school without graduating and joined Messali Hadj’s newly organized PPA in 
1937.121  Shortly after joining the PPA, Ben Bella was conscripted into the French Army 
and posted to an Alpine infantry regiment outside of Marseilles.122  He attained the rank 
of sergeant before France capitulated to the German occupation forces.  Ben Bella 
returned to Algeria following the French defeat, but was recalled to duty as a member of 
a Moroccan unit in 1943.123  Ben Bella assisted in the allied liberation of Rome, received 
three citations from the French government, and earned the rank of sergeant-major.124  
Throughout his tours in the military, Ben Bella remained politically active and worked to 
end discriminatory policies against Algerian conscripts through protests and his writings.  
Following the conclusion of WWII, Ben Bella heard of the French reprisals against 
Algerian nationalist uprising in Sétif and Guelma, and returned home in 1945 to assist in 
the struggle for Algerian independence.125  Upon his return, Ben Bella was elected a 
councillor for his hometown of Marnia and joined the MTLD.126  Ben Bella organized 
and resourced protests against the discriminatory election practices of the French 
authority.  After Ben Bella lost his family’s farm in Marnia, he moved to Algiers and 
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began underground work for the MTLD.127  In 1947, Ben Bella became the leader of the 
OS and began preparations for armed insurrection against the French authority.128  “The 
O.S. was first heard from in 1947 when it carried out a number of bombings and other 
terrorist activities.”129  Ben Bella’s militant ideology and successful planning of 
subversive activities expanded his influence within the Algerian resistance movement and 
he was elected chief political organizer for the MTLD in 1949.130  Ben Bella funded and 
resourced his subversive activities in Algeria through bank robbery and petty theft.  In 
1950, he was arrested and sentenced to eight years in prison for the robbery of the main 
Oran post office which netted the OS three million francs.131  With the OS exposed to the 
French intelligence agencies, the OS leadership that managed to avoid incarceration fled 
to Cairo, Tunis, or Tripoli.  In 1952, Ben Bella escaped from prison and traveled to Egypt 
to reestablish the OS.132  While in Egypt he met with Colonel Gamel Abdel Nasser who 
had recently overthrown King Farouk as the ruler of Egypt.  Nasser provided Ben Bella 
with inspiration as well as weapons, financial assistance, and tactical advice for the 
Algerian guerrilla movement.133  Inspired to begin direct action against the French 
authority in Algeria, Ben Bella along with Rabah Bitat, Mohammed Boudiaf, Belkacem 
Krim, Hocine Aït-Ahmed, Mohammed Khider, Ben Boulaid, Mahmud Didouche, and 
Ben Mehidid met in Egypt in 1954 and established the Revolutionary Committee for 
Unity and Action (CRUA).134  The CRUA was formed to undermine the existing 
revolutionary organizations in Algeria and overthrow the French colonial authority 
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through direct action. 135  In the spring of 1954, Ben Bella, Mustapha Ben Boulaid, 
Mohammed Boudiaf, and Mahmud Didouche met, once again, in Geneva, Switzerland to 
plan the revolt against French rule in Algeria.136  In October 1954, the CRUA was 
renamed the Front Libération Nationale (FLN) and the Armée de Libération Nationale 
(ALN) was formed.137  On 1 November 1954, the ALN launched a series of terrorist 
attacks and uprisings against French rule, which marked the beginning of Algeria’s war 
for independence.   
3. Insurgent Actions 
Though the initial phase of the FLN’s campaign against French colonial rule was 
well planned by the war council, the targets of the first terror attacks were relatively 
random and designed to destabilize the government.  “The FLN leaders did not plan 
much beyond the first step, and they improvised as they went along.”138  The FLN 
leadership divided Algeria into six wilayas (regions) and assigned a military commander 
to control the war effort in each region.139  The first phase of the FLN’s operations 
consisted of blind terrorism “designed primarily to attract publicity both for the cause of 
Algerian independence … and, secondarily, to spread insecurity.”140  The initial attacks 
focused on the Aurés Mountains, Constantine, Algiers, Kabylia, and Oran.  The FLN 
struck isolated French garrisons and conducted sabotage, bombings, and assassinations 
against symbols of the French authority.141  The second phase of the war was selective 
terrorism which was designed to control the Muslim population through the elimination 
of Muslims working with the French administration, destruction of trust between the 
Muslims and the French, incitement of the Muslim population against the French, and the 
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organization of the Muslim population into local committees.142  “Not all terrorist actions 
were so well calculated with a precise goal in mind, but since disorder automatically 
helps the insurgent, incoherent terror served its purpose merely by promoting 
instability.”143  The fear and instability created by the FLN’s attacks throughout Algeria 
set the conditions for the opening of a guerrilla war against the French.  The FLN 
initiated a guerrilla campaign quickly in areas where government control was weak or 
terrain limited government intervention.  The Aurès Mountains provided the perfect 
safehaven for the FLN to plan, resource, refit, and train for the guerrilla war.  As the 
guerrilla war expanded, the FLN supported the combat operations with an intensive 
propaganda campaign designed to discredit the French administration and encourage 
recruitment into the insurgency.144  Because the FLN received nearly unhindered support 
from the Muslim population in Algeria, the FLN was “able to fight a relentless guerrilla 
war, seldom attacking in force, always retreating before superior numbers, vanishing at 
dawn and re-emerging at nightfall.”145  Though Ben Bella planned and coordinated the 
FLN’s attacks on the French authority, he did not participate in the fighting and remained 
in Egypt to procure resources.  In 1954, Ben Bella was tried in absentia by an Algerian 
court and sentenced to death.146  As a result, Ben Bella was pursued by the French 
authorities and could not contribute to the military campaign without becoming a liability 
to the FLN.  Ben Bella organized the ‘forces of the exterior’ in Tunisia, Morocco, and 
Egypt to train new soldiers, raise funds for the war, and supply the ALN with weapons 
and munitions.147  After only five months of FLN attacks, the French authorities declared 
a state of emergency in Algeria due to the widespread revolt of the Muslim population 
throughout the country.  Neither the declaration of a state of emergency nor the 
introduction of large numbers of French conscripts in January of 1956 was able to quell 
                                                 
142 Galula, Pacification in Algeria, 1956–1958, 15–16. 
143 Ibid., 16. 
144 Ibid., 16–17. 
145 Joesten, The New Algeria, 28. 
146 Ibid., 49–50. 
147 Ibid., 50. 
 42
the unrest in Algeria.148  Though the insurgency in Algeria grew exponentially from 1954 
to 1956, the French government refused to take the insurgency seriously until late 1956 
when the terrorist attacks had exploded into a large-scale guerrilla war. 
4. Government Counteractions 
Following the end of WWII, France’s colonial empire began declining rapidly as 
Indochina, Tunisia, and Morocco fought successful wars of independence in the mid 
1950s.  These territorial losses fortified France’s desire to maintain Algeria in its sphere 
of influence and necessitated the pursuit of drastic methods to suppress the Algerian 
insurgency.  The French executed a massive surge of combat forces into Algeria to quell 
the insurgency.  From 1954 until the war ended in 1962, the French increased troop levels 
in Algeria from 50,000 soldiers to 400,000 soldiers.149  Though the French outnumbered 
the FLN insurgents by an eight to one ratio, the French were unable to eliminate the 
insurgents due to the populations unwavering support for the FLN fighters.  Faced with 
mounting losses and failures, the French government initiated secret negotiations with the 
FLN, while the military simultaneously attempted to target the FLN’s leadership and 
decapitate the organization.  In 1956, French delegations met secretly with the FLN five 
times and were prepared to begin open negotiations with Ben Bella in October.150   
Despite ongoing secret negotiations, the French military continued to target Ben 
Bella.  “From early on in the Algerian war, the French secret intelligence service had 
identified Ahmed Ben Bella as the ‘Number One leader’ of the Front de Libération 
Nationale (FLN) revolt and had mounted abortive attempts to assassinate him.”151  
Attempting to negotiate an end to the Algerian insurgency, the Tunisian and Moroccan 
heads of state invited Ben Bella to attend a secret summit meeting in Tunis with the a 
French delegation.152  The French Secret Service intercepted Ben Bella’s flight plans and 
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devised a plan to capture the FLN leader.  “On October 22, 1956, the French military 
broke international law and seized the Sultan of Morocco’s private aircraft, which carried 
important leaders of the Algerian revolution (Ben Bella, Budiaf Khider, Ait Ahmed, and 
a well-known intellectual, Moustapha Lacheraf).”153  Ben Bella and his associates spent 
the remainder of the war in French prison, but the capture failed to elicit France’s desired 
result.  While imprisoned in France, Ben Bella continued to lead the FLN and continued 
to fight for the rights of Algerian political prisoners through hunger strikes.154  The 
capture of Ben Bella ignited an international firestorm of criticism for France’s actions 
and galvanized North African support for the FLN.  Despite criticism, France attempted 
to capitalize on the removal of Ben Bella and began a heavy-handed counterinsurgency 
campaign to eliminate FLN safehavens.  In 1957, General Jacques Massu and a division 
of French parachutists cleared the Casbah, an insurgent stronghold in Algiers.  A 
concerted French military effort succeeded in retaking the major cities and population 
centers in Algeria, but these efforts proved inadequate as the FLN retreated to the safety 
of the Aurés Mountains and Tunisia to regroup and rearm.  With open support from 
Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco, the FLN continued its unhindered attacks on French 
interests in Algeria.  By 1959, France’s resolve in Algeria began to crack under the strain 
of internal government instability, a failure to quell the Algerian insurgency, and reports 
of rampant torture and extreme treatment of the Algerian Muslims.  In response to 
criticism at home, Charles de Gaulle, the president of France, began openly advocating 
self-determination and independence for Algeria.  With the guerrilla war stagnating 
French efforts and the possibility of achieving independence, the internal leadership of 
the FLN established a shadow government, the Gouvernement Provisoire de la 
République Algérienne (GPRA), to prepare for independence.155  Ben Bella, though 
imprisoned in France was elected vice-president of the new shadow government.156  “By 
1962 it became clear that the French government could not win the war in Algeria and 
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had to agree to self-determination for the Algerian People.”157  From prison, Ben Bella 
served as one of the FLN’s chief negotiators, and on 18 March 1962, the FLN and the 
French government signed the Evian Accords which ended the French Algerian War.  
Ben Bella was released from prison and returned to Algeria as a war hero and national 
icon.  In 1963, Ahmed Ben Bella, was elected Algeria’s first president, confirming the 
failure of the French Secret Service’s attempt to decapitate the FLN. 
5. Analysis 
The French Secret Service believed that the removal of Ahmed Ben Bella would 
leave the FLN leaderless and collapse the Algerian insurgency.  French intelligence 
sources identified Ben Bella as the leader of the FLN prior to the Muslim uprising in 
1954. 158  His meetings with North African leaders and ability to fund, arm, train, and 
supply Algerian insurgents presented Ben Bella as an excellent target.  However, French 
intelligence analysts failed to understand the leadership structure of the FLN.  The 
internal leadership of the FLN was organized into a loose hierarchy of regional, zone, 
sector, and district commanders with semi-autonomous control over their respective 
areas.159  Ben Bella controlled the external leadership of the FLN as well as the resources 
which supported the FLN’s internal leadership.  As a result, Ben Bella exercised some 
measure of strategic control over the internal leadership.  This leadership arrangement 
created a rift between Ben Bella and Ramdane Abane, the most powerful of the FLN’s 
internal leaders, and Ben Bella’s clear successor.160  The capture of Ben Bella proved a 
colossal blunder for the French government.  “Secretly, the ‘interior’ leaders were 
delighted by Ben Bella’s capture and incarceration.”161  The removal of Ben Bella 
allowed the more radical Abane to take strategic control of the FLN and direct a more 
aggressive terrorist policy against the French military.  The arrest united and galvanized 
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the FLN’s leadership; healing many of the internal divisions which prevented coordinated 
action against the French military.  The French believed that Ben Bella’s charismatic 
allure would fade while incarcerated, but Ben Bella continued to serve as a daily 
reminder of France’s oppression of the Algerian Muslims.  Through hunger strikes and 
international recognition as a political prisoner, Ben Bella legitimized the FLN’s struggle 
for independence, remained relevant as an FLN leader, and served as an inspiration to the 
suffering guerrilla fighters in Algeria.  The incarceration of Ben Bella also eliminated a 
willing negotiating partner.  Prior to incarceration, Ben Bella participated in peace 
negotiations with French delegations, but after five years in prison, Ben Bella refused any 
peace overtures which did not include Algerian sovereignty and an end to French 
influence in Algeria.162  As shown by Honig, eliminating negotiating partners can 
counteract the state’s strategy.  Ben Bella’s capture generated widespread international 
condemnation of the French Secret Service’s actions which eroded public support for the 
Algerian War in France and infuriated the rulers of Tunisia and Morocco.  After Ben 
Bella’s arrest, both Tunisia and Morocco openly financed, armed, and provided training 
facilities for FLN fighters.  The French Secret Service’s strategy of eliminating the FLN’s 
leadership failed to accomplish the designed intent because the FLN possessed a clear 
and legitimate leader to succeed Ahmed Ben Bella. 
Examining the counterfactuals in the Algerian insurgency provide additional 
insight into the case study.  In the beginning of the war, Ben Bella was a willing 
negotiating partner with the French government.  In fact, he was flying to Tunis to attend 
secret negotiations with the French delegation.  Had the French Secret Service shot Ben 
Bella’s plane down or managed to kill Ben Bella, negotiations would still have ended 
before a settlement was reached.  It is unlikely that Ben Bella’s hard line successor would 
have continued negotiations with the French in the event of Ben Bella’s death.  The 
structure of the FLN’s internal leadership ensured that Ben Bella always possessed a 
successor in the event of his capture or death.  To defeat the FLN insurgency, the French 
Secret Service had to undermine all the violent FLN leaders of the FLN and legitimize 
the non-violent leadership of a leader like Messali Hadj.  Ultimately, France’s only 
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opportunity to improve its position and maintain its colony in Algeria was to negotiate a 
settlement to the conflict with Ben Bella or a non-violent Algerian leader. 
C. TARGETED KILLING WITH NO NAMED SUCCESSOR: FATHI 
SHIKAKI 
Fathi Shikaki, a Palestinian medical doctor, founded the Palestinian Islamic Jihad 
in 1980 in order to liberate Palestine from Israeli occupation through armed confrontation 
with Israel.  Shikaki formed the Palestinian Islamic Jihad in response to the failure of 
Yasser Arafat and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) to show any credible 
advances in achieving Palestinian independence.  Though the PLO, Hamas, Hezbollah, 
and Palestinian Islamic Jihad differed on the strategy of achieving a Palestinian state, the 
organizations were willing to coexist and work towards a common goal.  However, the 
emergence of the Palestinian-Israeli peace process in the early 1990s fragmented the 
organizations.  Hamas and the PLO formed a temporary alliance to strengthen the 
possibility of a negotiated settlement with Israel.  The 1993 Oslo Accords allowed the 
PLO and Hamas to negotiate a settlement with Israel which provided the “important first 
step towards the creation of a Palestinian State because it transferred to the PLO practical 
control over a small amount of territory in Gaza and the town of Jericho.”163  Fathi 
Shikaki and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad refused to participate in the negotiations and 
increased attacks on Israeli citizens in an attempt to disrupt the negotiations.  In 1995, the 
Israeli Mossad killed Fathi Shikaki on the island of Malta.  Shikaki’s death proved a 
devastating loss to the organization.  Without an effective leader, Palestinian Islamic 
Jihad ceased to pose a credible threat to Israel or the peace negotiations. 
1. Origins of the Insurgency 
The Palestinian Islamic Jihad was founded in Egypt in 1980 with inspiration from 
the Muslim Brotherhood.  The Muslim Brotherhood is a fundamentalist Islamic 
movement founded in Egypt by Hassan al-Banna in 1928.  “The Muslim Brotherhood 
seeks to restore the historical Caliphate and then expand its authority over the entire 
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world, dismantling all non-Islamic governments.”164  Though active throughout the 
Middle East, the Brotherhood focuses its efforts on overthrowing the Egyptian 
government through mostly political means.  Three Sunni Muslim Palestinian students 
studying in Egypt; Fathi Shikaki, Abdul Aziz Odeh, and Bashir Moussa, believed that 
Palestine, not Egypt, was central to the transformation of the whole Arab world and split 
from the Muslim Brotherhood.  The three students “believed they could challenge the 
secular nationalism of the Muslim Brotherhood, especially since the PLO’s armed 
struggle was showing no concrete results.”165  The Palestinian Islamic Jihad was a small 
but fiercely militant Islamic group formed from a handful of loosely connected factions 
led by Fathi Shikaki.166  Abdul Aziz Odeh served as the organization’s spiritual 
advisor.167  Shikaki’s ideology and beliefs were formed from his experiences in a 
Palestinian refugee camp and inspired by the 1979 Iranian Revolution.  These two events 
led Shikaki to espouse the violent overthrow of Israel as central to the liberation of 
Palestine, the creation of a Palestinian state, and lasting change in the Middle East.  
Following the assassination of Anwar Sadat In 1981, Shikaki and the Palestinian Islamic 
Jihad were expelled from Egypt and fled to Palestine where the organization established 
terrorist cells in Israeli occupied areas.168  By 1986, Fathi Shikaki and the Palestinian 
Islamic Jihad were prepared to initiate a terrorist campaign against the State of Israel. 
2. Insurgent Leadership 
Fathi Shikaki was the central leader in the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.  Shikaki was 
born near Nablus in the Fara Refugee camp in 1951.  Growing up as a refugee in 
Palestine, Shikaki felt the isolation and oppression of Israeli occupation, which impacted 
the rest of his life.  In 1974, Shikaki moved to Egypt and entered medical school at the 
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Zagazig University.  The university was a hotbed of Islamic militancy and Shikaki 
embraced radical Islam and the Muslim Brotherhood while studying in Egypt.169  Upon 
graduation, Shikaki opened a private medical clinic in Gaza.  Despite his medical 
practice, Shikaki drew inspiration from the 1979 Iranian Revolution and continued to 
develop his radical ideology.  In 1980, he broke with the Muslim Brotherhood and 
organized the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.  Following his exile from Egypt in 1981, Shikaki 
began low-level attacks on Israeli citizens from his base in Gaza.  In 1986, Fathi Shikaki 
was arrested by the Israeli police and sentenced to four years in jail for arms 
smuggling.170  Shikaki was deported to Lebanon in April 1988, and later settled in 
Damascus, Syria in 1990.171  The Syrian government provided a safe location for Shikaki 
and Palestinian Islamic Jihad to plan and conduct operations against Israel.  Shikaki 
remained in Syria and transmitted orders via the telephone or internet to local planners in 
Israel and Palestine.172  Shikaki changed his tactics with the initiation of the Israeli-
Palestinian peace negotiations.  The peace negotiations between Israel and the PLO 
infuriated Shikaki who believed that Palestine must be liberated by force.173  In an 
attempt to disrupt the peace negotiations, the Palestinian Islamic jihad began attacking 
Israeli government targets rather than civilian targets.  Though the attacks failed to 
prevent the signing of the Oslo Accords, the disruption of the peace process was central 
in Israel’s decision to eliminate Shikaki. 
3. Insurgent Actions 
The disruption of the Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations served the interests of 
numerous countries in the Middle East and North Africa.  A ceasefire between the 
Palestinians and Israelis would allow the Israelis to focus their military efforts against 
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Iran and Libya.  As a result, both Iran and Libya supported the Palestinian Islamic Jihad’s 
military actions against Israel.  Iran provided Shikaki with financing for training camps as 
well as guidance and direction for numerous attacks on Israeli targets in the West Bank 
and Gaza.174  The Libyan leader, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, trained Palestinian Islamic 
Jihad fighters and issued passports to the group’s members.175  Gaddafi issued a passport 
to Fathi Shikaki under the name of Ibrahim Shawesh, which allowed Shikaki to travel 
freely and procure support for the Palestinian Islamic Jihad’s fight. 176  The support from 
Iran and Libya proved invaluable in financing and training fighters for attacks against 
Israel. 
The Palestinian Islamic Jihad “never bothered with building the network of 
community health and education services in Gaza or the West Bank that has helped 
Hamas gain popularity.”177  Instead, Shikaki directed his organization to violently 
overthrow the Israeli government and oppose any negotiations with Israel.  The 
Palestinian Islamic Jihad carried out dozens of attacks on Israeli targets between 1986 
and 1995.  Shikaki initiated his terrorism campaign against the Israeli government in 
October 1986 with the Gate of Moors attack.  During the attack, two Palestinian Jihad 
members threw hand grenades at an Israeli Army inauguration ceremony.178  The attack 
killed one and wounded sixty-eight Army recruits.179  In 1987, the Palestinian Islamic 
Jihad assassinated an Israeli police captain.  Following the arrest and deportation of 
Shikaki and Odeh to Lebanon, Palestinian Islamic Jihad regrouped and continued its 
attacks on Israel.  The signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993 angered many Palestinians 
who felt betrayed by their representatives in the PLO and Hamas.  As a result, the 
Palestinian Islamic Jihad’s membership increased to three-hundred fighters in Lebanon 
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and three-hundred fighters in Gaza.180  In 1995, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad killed 
nineteen Israeli military personnel at a bus stop in Netanya.181  Several months later, the 
Palestinian Islamic Jihad executed a suicide bombing in Tel Aviv which killed thirteen 
Israeli civilians.182  The organization effectively used suicide bombings on targets 
selected to maximize Israeli casualties throughout 1995.  Shikaki directed the attacks 
from Damascus, while local planners in the Israeli occupied areas used secret locations to 
prepare explosives and suicide bombers for their missions.183  The attacks were designed 
to destabilize the peace negotiations, and drew criticism from not only the Israelis, but 
also the PLO and Hamas.  The timing and potential impact of the Palestinian Islamic 
Jihad’s attacks threatened to stall the fragile peace negotiations, and forced the Israeli 
government to take action to prevent continued interference. 
4. Government Counteractions 
Shikaki’s strong ties and frequent travels to Libya provided Israel with the 
opportunity to eliminate the terrorist leader.  Gaddafi financially supported and 
maintained close ties with the violent Palestinian organizations in Israel.  However, when 
the PLO and Hamas began negotiating with Israel, Gaddafi withdrew his support for the 
Palestinian organizations with the exception of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.  Following 
the Oslo Accords, Gaddafi began expelling Palestinians from Libya to protest the peace 
negotiations.184  In response, Shikaki flew to Libya to meet with Gaddafi and to ask 
Gaddafi to stop expelling Palestinians from the country.185  The two leaders quarreled 
during the meeting and Shikaki left Libya shortly after arriving.186  On his return trip to 
Damascus, Shikaki stopped for the night at his favorite hotel on the Mediterranean island 
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of Malta.187  “Maltese newspapers and radio said [Shikaki] was shot in the head at point-
blank range by a man in black in the seaside resort of Sliema hours after arriving in 
Malta.”188  Though not confirmed, the Israeli Mossad is believed to be responsible for the 
targeted killing of Fathi Shikaki.  The death of Fathi Shikaki on 26 October 1995 
weakened the Palestinian Islamic Jihad significantly.  “The assassination in 1995 of 
[Palestinian Islamic Jihad] chief Fathi Shikaki in Malta seriously damaged that 
organization, which failed to recuperate fully until April 2002.”189  The Palestinian 
Islamic Jihad reemerged seven years after the death of Fathi Shikaki due to the Second 
Intifada which began in 2000.190  The sharp increase in the number and ferocity of 
attacks between 2000 and 2002 created the environmental conditions which drove many 
Palestinians to support more violent ideologies and allowed the Palestinian Islamic Jihad 
to reform its support base. 
5. Analysis 
The Palestinian Islamic Jihad formed around Fathi Shikaki, who served as the 
group’s ideological leader as well as the overseer of all operations.  This centralization of 
authority and decision making limited the Palestinian Islamic Jihad’s ability to adapt to 
the loss of their leader.  Shikaki’s death created a leadership void within the organization 
which could not be filled easily.191  Without a named successor to take over leadership of 
the organization, the members were forced to elect a new leader without Shikaki’s 
approval.  Ramadan Abdullah Shallah, a former part-time professor at the University of 
South Florida was elected the new leader of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad in October 
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1995.192  “Most independent American monitors of terrorist activity say they were not 
familiar with Shallah, although Arab journalists now say he helped organize the 
Palestinian branch of Islamic Jihad in the early 1980s.”193  While qualified to lead the 
organization, Shallah’s time in the United States and absence from the organization cast 
doubt on his character.  Investigations conducted after Shallah departed the United States 
for Syria concluded that he had not participated in any terrorist activities while at the 
University of Central Florida.194  Shallah also faced a united front from Palestinian 
groups and the Israeli government working towards a negotiated peace.  “The sharp 
decline in terrorist attacks, particularly the bloody suicide bombings, was due to the 
combined preventative counter-terrorist policy of the [Palestinian Authority] and 
Israel.”195  Shallah lacked the ideological and charismatic appeal that Shikaki possessed 
and was unable to counter the alliance between the Palestinian Authority and the Israeli 
government.196  Shikaki was also plagued by a lack of distinction within Palestine.  
Though Shallah spoke vehemently against Israel, he never captured the legitimacy of the 
Palestinian Islamic Jihad’s core followers or the Palestinian population.  “After five years 
at the Jihad’s helm, Shallah [remained] so little known that neither the general manager 
of Jerusalem’s largest Arab newspaper or the head of a leading Arab think tank had ever 
heard of him.”197  Prior to the beginning of the Second Intifada, Fathi Shikaki and his 
brother Dr. Khalil Shikaki were better known and respected in Palestine than Shallah.198  
Shallah’s lack of notoriety may have resulted from his inability to travel beyond the 
confines of his Syrian headquarters.  Unlike Shikaki, Shallah did not travel to the West 
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Bank, Gaza, or other Arab countries to build support for the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.199  
The chances of Shallah’s capture or assassination outside Syria were prohibitive to 
international travel.  Without the charismatic appeal of Shikaki, the physical presence in 
the fight against Israel, and the ability muster large support within the Arab community, 
Shallah lacked the legitimacy to effectively lead the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.  Lacking 
the legitimacy of his core followers, Shallah did not possess the strength to counteract the 
powerful attraction of the Palestinian-Israeli peace process.  As a result, Shallah and the 
Palestinian Islamic Jihad were overwhelmed by larger organizations like Hamas and the 
Palestinian Authority and slipped into obscurity until 2002.  Only the complete 
breakdown of peace negotiations in Palestine and the initiation of the widespread 
violence which characterized the Intifada Al-Aqsa in 2000 allowed the Palestinian 
Islamic Jihad to reemerge as a viable terrorist organization.  The Second Intifada created 
violence and anger against Israel which drove Palestinians back to violent terrorist 
organizations like the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. 
The Israeli government may have employed the best solution to collapse the 
Palestinian Islamic Jihad.  Without a clear successor, Fathi Shikaki’s assassination failed 
to engender the same outrage that other Palestinian martyrs received.  Had the Israeli 
government incarcerated Fathi Shikaki, it is doubtful that the strategy would have 
collapsed the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.  As the earlier records show, Shikaki would not 
have reconciled with the government or encouraged his followers to embrace the 
Palestinian-Israeli peace process.  From prison, Shikaki could also have communicated 
with his followers and conferred legitimacy upon Ramadan Abdullah Shallah.  However, 
imprisoning Shikaki was preferable to the Israeli government not acting.  The Palestinian 
Islamic Jihad’s frequent attacks against Israeli targets would certainly have disrupted the 
peace negotiations.  Had Shikaki appointed Shallah as his successor prior to Shikaki’s 
death, it is likely that Shallah would have possessed the legitimacy to counter the peace 
process and continue violent attacks against Israel.  However, this appointment would 
certainly have caused Shallah’s arrest in the United States.   
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D. TARGETED INCARCERATION WITH NO NAMED SUCCESSOR: 
ABIMAEL GUZMAN 
Abimael Guzman, a university professor in Peru, founded the Shining Path or 
Sendero Luminoso in 1970 to overthrow the Peruvian elites in Lima and install a Maoist-
based communist regime in Peru.  Guzman is viewed by his followers as “the Fourth 
Sword of Marxism, a heroic figure whose life’s work and ideological contributions stand 
in logical order with those of Marx, Lenin, and Mao.”200  The Shining Path expanded 
steadily and by 1992, the Peruvian government was on the verge of collapsing under the 
threat of constant terrorist attacks across the country.  Guzman single-handedly directed 
the Shining Path’s operations, and created a cult-of-personality within the organization.  
Upon Guzman’s capture in 1992, the Shining Path collapsed, and “within three years, the 
insurgency ceased to pose a serious threat to the Peruvian State.”201  
1. Origins of the Insurgency 
The origins of the Shining Path were rooted in the ideology of Jose Carlos 
Mariategui.  In 1923, Mariategui formed the Peruvian Communist Party to fuse 
communist ideology with Indian nationalism.202  Mariategui believed that a peasant-
based uprising by oppressed highland Indians could recapture the society destroyed by 
Spanish conquest and the urban elite in Lima.203  The ideology espoused by Mariategui 
united the Peruvian Communist Party until 1964 when the Sino-Soviet split divided the 
party.  The pro-Moscow wing of the party supported a traditional non-violent strategy 
which emphasized achieving the party’s goals through peaceful means and co-option of 
the ruling class.204  The pro-Chinese wing of the party, also known as PCP-Bandera Roja 
(Red Flag), espoused a strategy of armed struggle and sought to follow the example of 
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Mao Tse Tung in China.  The pro-Chinese faction “declared that the revolution would 
originate in the countryside through the mobilization of the peasantry and lead to the final 
encirclement of urban Peru.”205  The ideological divisions over the importance of armed 
struggle continued to plague the Peruvian Communist Party.  In 1970, PCP-Bandera 
Roja split once again due to complaints that the party’s leadership was not moving to 
initiate armed revolt against the government of Peru.  During the rift, the more radical 
members of the organization, including Abimael Guzman and his followers, were 
expelled from PCP-Bandera Roja.  The cleavage of Guzman and the more militant 
factions of the PCP-Bandera Roja severed the final restraints on Guzman and facilitated 
the formation of a more radical organization focused on the violent overthrow of the 
Peruvian government.  Guzman quickly solidified his core followers and named the 
organization the Revolutionary Student Front for the Shining Path of Mariategui or 
simplified to the Shining Path.  
The Shining Path grew quickly in the remote Andean districts of Peru where 
poverty was rampant and rich landowners oppressed their Indian tenants.  In the 
Ayacucho department, three quarters of the inhabitants lived by subsistent farming, a fifth 
of the peasants were tied to rich landowners as serfs, and servants were regularly raped or 
kicked off the land by landowners.206  The district of Ayacucho provided the perfect 
conditions for the development and growth of the Shining Path and its revolutionary 
Marxist ideology.  The extreme poverty, absence of schools and medical clinics, 
malnutrition, and contempt for the central government allowed the Shining Path to recruit 
disenfranchised Indians into the organization.207  As the Shining Path expanded from 
Ayacucho, membership grew to include poor highland peasants, urban unemployed, 
radical leftist students, and organized labor.208  Guzman inspired this heterogeneous 
following through an effective blend of Mao’s teachings on peasant-based rebellion with 
Mariategui’s native socialism, which spoke to the discontent and social realities in Peru. 
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2. Insurgent Leadership 
Abimael Guzman grew up as the illegitimate son of prosperous white father in 
Arequipa, Peru.209  Inspired by Marx, Lenin, Mao Tse Tung, the Cuban Revolution, and 
two trips to China, Guzman sought to bring about a Marxist revolution in Peru through 
armed struggle.  Guzman believed education was essential to recruitment and to the 
creation of a core group of followers.  As a professor of philosophy at the National 
University of San Cristobal de Huamanga, Guzman taught his ideological beliefs in 
Marxist revolution through armed struggle.  Guzman quickly expanded the recruitment 
base for the Shining Path in 1971, when he became the personnel director for the 
university.210  This position allowed him to hire a cadre of radical professors capable of 
indoctrinating the students with the ideology of the Shining Path.  Many of these students 
returned to their villages and towns following graduation to teach and expand the 
network of political activists.  From the formation of the Shining Path in 1970 until 1977, 
Guzman focused on educating his followers, recruiting new members, and expanding his 
support base within the Andean highlands.211  Guzman also organized the Shining Path 
to begin operations against the government of Peru.  The Shining Path was organized 
with a semi-hierarchical structure designed to control the growing guerrilla army.212  The 
hub of the shining Path is the National Directorate and the inner circle of the central 
committee which makes decisions and directs the outer rings composed of the full 
committee, the party, the guerrilla army and front organizations.213  Guzman, as the 
leader of the Shining Path, maintained central control of strategic decisions and exercised 
operational control through the National Directorate and the central committee.214  The 
central committee of the Shining Path directs six regional commands which are 
responsible for “establishing bases, recruitment, building a network of local support, and 
                                                 
209 Strong, Shining Path: A Case Study in Ideological Terrorism, 2–3. 
210 McCormick, The Shining Path and the Future of Peru, 5. 
211 Ibid., 4. 
212 Strong, Shining Path: A Case Study in Ideological Terrorism, 6. 
213 Ibid., 6. 
214 McCormick, The Shining Path and the Future of Peru, 6. 
 57
planning and carrying out local operations.”215  Members of the inner circle dispersed 
throughout Peru to oversee the operations of the regional commanders and maintain lines 
of communication back to Guzman through a system of couriers, dead drops, and the 
national postal system.216  This intricate system of communication allowed Guzman to 
exercise control over local operations which were carried out by Shinning Path members 
organized into small cells with a local support structure.217  Organized around a strict 
hierarchy, the Shining Path emerged from its recruitment and training phase with a 
national logistical support network, an army of trained insurgents, and a strong 
ideological core of followers who enforced strict obedience to Guzman.  The slow 
systematic growth of the Shining Path provided a safehaven and tactical space for the 
organization to begin planning for armed confrontation with the government of Peru. 
3. Insurgent Actions 
In May 1980, Abimael Guzman and the Shining Path launched the first attacks 
against the Peruvian government.  The Shining Path attacked polling stations in the poor 
village of Ayacucho in an attempt to “instigate a popular war that will begin in the high 
country and spread throughout rural Peru, and surround and finally overwhelm the 
cities.”218  Guzman believed that the overthrow of the government required a coordinated 
strategy consisting of five phases: “(1) agitation and armed propaganda; (2) sabotage 
against Peru’s socioeconomic system; (3) the generalization of the guerrilla struggle; (4) 
the conquest and expansion of the revolution’s support base and the strengthening of the 
guerrilla army; and (5) general civil war.”219  From 1980 until 1983, the Shining Path 
attacked Peru’s civic infrastructure, government institutions, and symbols of capitalism in 
order to destabilize the Peruvian government and force the government to overreact.  
Fernando Belaúnde Terry, the president of Peru, initially neglected to take action against 
the Shining Path due to fears of another coup in the country.  By 1981, the Peruvian 
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government was forced to take action against the Shining Path and instituted new anti-
terrorism laws, declared a state of emergency in Ayacucho, suspended constitutional 
protections, and created a special police unit (Sinchis) to hunt down member of the 
Shining Path.220  The heavy-handed methods of the Sinchis, government oppression of 
the population, and continued neglect of the poor remote regions of Peru allowed the 
Shining Path to expand recruitment and operations quickly.  By 1983, the Shining Path 
began phase three of Guzman’s strategy and extended operations outside the central 
highlands.221  As the Shining Path continued to extend their reach, the government of 
Peru responded with military force and further restricted civil rights.  These 
countermeasures once again created animosity towards the central government and 
increased the recruitment potential of the Shining Path.  By 1985, the Shining Path had 
extended their reach to the entirety of Peru, had begun phase four of Guzman’s strategy, 
and were poised to initiate combat operations in Lima.222  The growth of the Shining 
Path’s military arm coincided with the emergence of Guzman’s new political authority.  
As the central government was pushed out of a region by the Shining Path, Guzman filled 
the void, creating a shadow government which was prepared to takeover authority when 
Peru’s central government inevitably collapsed.  Despite the significant successes won by 
Guzman and the Shining Path in Peru, the organization eventually broke down due the 
cult-of-personality which grew around Guzman and the lack of subordinates capable of 
succeeding Guzman’s leadership. 
4. Government Counteractions 
The Shining Path’s attacks on Lima and the elite citizens of Peru forced the 
government to reexamine its anti-terrorism strategy and take more decisive action against 
the Shining Path.  The Peruvian government conducted a complete review of its 
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counterinsurgency strategy from 1988 to 1989.223  By 1990, the government unveiled a 
new strategy which focused on civil action programs in urban neighborhoods, the 
formation of a special intelligence group (GEIN) to track down Guzman, the creation of 
civil defense forces (Rondas) to defend the population against the Shining Path’s attacks, 
and the integration of local soldiers into military units to gather intelligence and prevent 
indiscriminate attacks.224  Peru’s President Alberto Fujimori also initiated legislation in 
1991–1992 which expanded the definitions of terrorism and increases penalties for 
terrorist activities.225  President Fujimori also “[suspended] democracy to allow for a 
total campaign against [the Shining Path].”226  These government actions placed 
increasing pressure on the leadership of the Shining Path and forced Guzman to convene 
a “plenary meeting of Shining Path’s central committee” to discuss the organization’s 
strategy in Lima.227  The GEIN received intelligence on the meeting’s location and 
surrounded the house.  Abimael Guzman and several of his leading lieutenants were 
arrested on 12 September 1992 in a middle class neighborhood of Lima.  The arrest 
“dealt what is likely to prove a deadly blow to the guerrilla’s chances of seizing power in 
Peru.”228  The loss of Guzman’s leadership proved insurmountable to the Shining Path’s 
hierarchical command structure and the organization disintegrated quickly.  “Although 
violent incidents declined only slightly over the 6 months following Guzman’s capture 
and then increased over 7 months in 1993, these proved to be the last gasps of a dying 
movement.229  By 1994, the Shining Path could no longer threaten the government of 
Peru. 
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5. Analysis 
The Shining Path formed around the charismatic leadership and driving ideology 
of Abimael Guzman.  Guzman created a cult-of-personality in which he was not only the 
founder and leader, but also the “spiritual leader and guiding light.”230  The loss of 
Guzman created a leadership void in the Shining Path that Guzman’s subordinates were 
unable to fill.  “It is doubtful that there is anybody in the party with the same capacity as 
a political-military analyst, strategist, and tactician” as Guzman.231  Without Guzman’s 
leadership, the Shining Path was “unable to adapt the pre-laid plans as and when 
necessary: develop effective new ones; and resolve internal contradictions or disputes 
advantageously, thereby weakening the party and creating the possibility of divisions.”232  
The fact that Guzman was arrested by the government forces and sentenced to life in 
prison and not killed in the raid is also significant.  “The preservation of Guzman is likely 
to perpetrate a leadership vacuum in Shining Path because while he remains alive, 
nobody is likely to seize the initiative too boldly.”233  Mannes notes this affect as well in 
his analysis of terrorist organizations.  While the loss of Guzman was a significant blow 
to the Shining Path, the proximate cause of the Shining Path’s collapse was the lack of a 
viable successor to take over when Guzman was captured.  There is no evidence that 
Guzman appointed a successor prior to his capture in 1992.234  However, even if Guzman 
had appointed a successor, the appointed successor was probably eliminated prior to 
taking control.  Many of Guzman’s closest lieutenants were captured or killed in the late 
1980s and the majority of the central committee was captured with Guzman in 1992.  The 
lack of a viable successor threw the Shining Path into organizational disarray.  Without 
Guzman’s leadership, the Shining Path lacked direction and focus to control the popular 
war against the government.  The Shining Path’s historic support base within the 
population also began to crumble once Guzman’s larger-than-life personality was 
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removed and casualties from the Shining Path’s indiscriminate attacks began to mount.  
With Guzman in prison, the Shining Path lacked not only a leader, but a successor as 
well.  Any candidate attempting to succeed Guzman would be illegitimate since they 
were not appointed by Guzman, and could not fill the void in Guzman’s cult-of-
personality.   
It is possible that the targeted killing of Abimael Guzman would have produced 
similar results as his incarceration.  The death of Guzman as well as the incarceration of 
the majority of his inner circle would still have eliminated a clear successor to the 
Shining Path’s leaders.  However, the death of Guzman would have prevented his partial 
reconciliation with the government and would have eliminated the cult-of-personality 
which restrained any potential successors from fully committing to the leadership role.  
Capturing Abimael Guzman was preferable to killing him, and killing him is certainly 
preferable to doing nothing.  Had Guzman successfully appointed a successor who was 
not captured, it is likely that the Shining Path would have been able to continue to fight 
the Peruvian government.  With legitimacy conferred upon the successor by Guzman, the 
Shining Path would have naturally coalesced around the new leader and continued 
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V. ANALYSIS 
The examination of successful and failed targeted killing and targeted 
incarceration policies employed against the Frente Sandinista de Liberacíon Nacional in 
Nicaragua, the Front Libération Nationale in Algeria, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad in 
Israel, and Sendero Luminoso in Peru, allow the testing of the four hypotheses proposed 
in the methodology section.   
H1:  If targeted killings are executed against leaders of insurgencies with no apparent 
successor, then insurgent violence should decrease after their leader is killed. 
The cases study examining the assassination of Fathi Shikaki provides support for 
this hypothesis.  The Palestinian Islamic Jihad ceased to pose a credible threat to Israel 
and the PLO after the death of Shikaki.  The organization was unable to mount any 
violent attacks against Israel or the PLO until 2002 when the Second Intifada began.  The 
Second Intifada created an environment of widespread violence and heavy-handed Israeli 
reprisals which drove many Palestinians back to the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.  While the 
peace negotiations between the PLO and Israel limited the Palestinian Islamic Jihad’s 
ability to conduct violent attacks, the stated policy of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad was to 
disrupt the peace negotiations and achieve a Palestinian state through armed struggle.  It 
is therefore, safe to assume that the Palestinian Islamic Jihad intended to conduct attacks 
against Israel, but lacked the leadership, weapons, and fighters to launch a successful 
attack.   
An examination of the Israeli government’s actions against Fathi Shikaki and the 
Palestinian Islamic Jihad show that a policy of targeted killing when employed against an 
insurgent force without a clear successor to its leader is more likely to succeed.  When 
Fathi Shikaki was assassinated by the Israeli Mossad he failed to name a successor to the 
organization prior to his death.  Without a clear successor, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad 
struggled to find a suitable replacement.  Though Ramadan Abdullah Shallah was 
selected to succeed Shikaki, Abdullah never possessed any credibility or legitimacy 
within the group.  Shikaki never personally named Abdullah as his successor, and 
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Abdullah’s tenure in the United States compromised his credibility with the 
organization’s hardliners.  Without a legitimate leader, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad 
collapsed as its members joined other organizations or embraced the peace negotiations 
between the PLO and Israel.   
H2:  If targeted incarcerations are executed against insurgent leaders without a clear 
successor then insurgent violence should decrease following the arrest of the leader. 
The case study of Abimael Guzman and the Shining Path provides support for the 
hypothesis that targeted incarcerations against insurgent leaders without a clear successor 
decreases the likelihood of insurgent violence against the state.  Abimael Guzman’s arrest 
in 1992 facilitated the collapse of the Shining Path.  Guzman possessed a larger-than-life, 
charismatic personality which he used to control the Shining Path.  Though he was 
surrounded by a semi-hierarchical organization and a core inner circle of followers, he 
failed to name a successor to the organization prior to his arrest.  Following the arrest of 
Guzman, Oscar Ramirez Durand assumed control of the Shining Path, but the 
organization declined quickly.  Insurgent violence decreased for six months after 
Guzman’s arrest, then surged for seven months in 1993.235  However, after 1993, the 
Shining Path’s violent attacks decreased to an insignificant level.  Though Durand vowed 
to fight the Peruvian government, Guzman encouraged the Shining Path to negotiate a 
settlement with the government and surrender.  Despite his imprisonment, Guzman’s 
followers still saw him as the legitimate leader of the Shining Path and the majority of his 
fighters ended their struggle against the Peruvian government.  As long as Guzman was 
alive, Durand could never possess the legitimacy to successfully lead the Shining Path.  
In 1999, Oscar Ramirez Durand was arrested in the Peruvian highlands with a tired and 
hungry band of female guerrillas.  The seven years of leadership took an enormous 
physical and emotional toll on Durand, but his lack of legitimacy within the Shining Path 
prevented him from achieving any significant gains against the Peruvian government.  
The incarceration of Guzman represented a loss the Shining Path’s new leadership could 
not overcome. 
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H3: If targeted killings are executed against insurgent groups with a clear successor to 
the leader, then violence will increase or remain constant. 
The case study of the Sandinista revolution provides support for this hypothesis.  
Nicaragua’s policy of targeted killing employed against the FSLN and the UDEL 
increased violent attacks against the state.  The deaths of Fonseca and Chamorro enraged 
the population and galvanized support for the resistance which Daniel Ortega and Rafael 
Córdova Rivas were able to harness to accomplish their organization’s objectives.  In the 
wake of the assassinations, violent attacks against the government skyrocketed.  The 
increase in insurgent violence forced the Nicaraguan government to adopt more 
repressive and heavy-handed tactics which further inflamed the population.  Ultimately, 
The FSLN and UDEL managed to escalate the violence to the point where the Somoza 
regime’s position was no longer tenable, and Somoza was forced to flee the country.   
While Israel successfully collapsed the Palestinian Islamic Jihad through a policy 
of targeted killing, the Nicaraguan government failed against the FSLN and the UDEL.  
Nicaragua failed because both Carlos Fonseca Amador and Pedro Joaquín Chamorro both 
named successors prior to their deaths.  By naming Daniel Ortega and Rafael Córdova 
Rivas as their successors, Fonseca and Chamorro ensured that their successors possessed 
the legitimacy to lead the organizations and continue the insurgency against the 
Nicaraguan government.  With legitimacy passed to their successors, both Fonseca and 
Chamorro were viewed as martyrs, fathers of the revolution, and figures to rally support 
around.  The assassinations of Fonseca and Chamorro swelled the ranks of the FSLN.  
From the mid-1960s until 1976, the FSLN commanded a fighting force of around 150 
guerrillas.236  The number of guerrilla fighters rose exponentially to 1000 fighters after 
the death of Fonseca, and to 5,000 after the death of Chamorro.237  The increase in 
guerrilla fighters combined with the overwhelming popular uprisings created an 
environment where Somoza and the National Guard possessed no alternatives but to 
surrender control to the country to the rebels. 
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H4:  If targeted incarcerations are executed against insurgent leaders with a clear 
successor, then insurgent violence should increase or remain constant following the 
arrest of the leader. 
The case study of the FLN in Algeria provides support for this hypothesis.  The 
targeted incarceration of Ahmed Ben Bella in 1956 failed to decrease the insurgent 
violence against the French government because Ben Bella’s successor, Ramdane Abane, 
possessed the legitimacy to assume control of the Front Libération Nationale.  Ben Bella 
possessed a distinct charisma which allowed him to control both the external and internal 
factions of the FLN, but he lacked the cult of personality that characterized Abimael 
Guzman in Peru.  This distinction is important in understanding the divergent outcomes 
in Algeria and Peru.  When Ben Bella was imprisoned, his loyal support base within the 
FLN transferred their allegiance to Ramdane Abane, the leader of the internal FLN.  As a 
result, Abane seamlessly assumed operational control of the FLN.  While in prison, Ben 
Bella’s philosophy hardened and he became more resistant to negotiations with the 
French.  Unlike Guzman, Ben Bella never undermined the authority of his successor 
while incarcerated.  Though Ben Bella was no longer the operational leader of the 
resistance, he continued to serve as an inspiration to the guerrilla fighters in Algeria.  The 
FLN perceived Ben Bella as a martyr due to his long incarceration in France and multiple 
hunger strikes.  In response to his capture and subsequent suffering, violent attacks 
increased exponentially.  At the beginning of the insurgency, France allocated 50,000 
soldiers to Algeria; however, by the end of the conflict France was forced to allocate 
400,000 soldiers to the defense of Algeria.238  Despite the substantial influx of 
government forces, France could not quell the escalating insurgent violence, and in 1962 
France signed the Evian Accords to end the Algerian War and granted the Algerian 
people the right to self-determination. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
This thesis provides some new insights into the study of the effectiveness of 
targeted killing and targeted incarceration.  The evidence suggests that the state’s 
employment of a strategy of targeted killing or targeted incarceration against an insurgent 
organization without a clear successor is more likely to cause the insurgent organization 
to collapse.  This thesis also suggests that both targeted killing and targeted incarceration 
are effective in reducing insurgent violence five years after the event. 
The proper application of a policy of targeted killing or targeted incarceration can 
collapse an insurgent organization; however, the improper application of this strategy can 
lead to the overthrow of the government.  The Israeli government successfully collapsed 
the Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Israel through the targeted killing of Fathi Shikaki 
because Shikaki failed to name a successor and the eventual appointee lacked the 
legitimacy to lead the organization.  Similarly, the Peruvian government successfully 
collapsed the Shining Path because Abimael Guzman failed to name a successor before 
his capture, and the eventual successor never achieved the legitimacy to lead because he 
remained locked in a power struggle with the imprisoned Guzman.  As the French 
government in Algeria and the Nicaraguan government discovered, attempting to 
collapse an insurgent organization through a strategy of targeted killing or incarceration 
requires detailed knowledge of the insurgency’s command structure.  The French failed 
in Algeria because Ahmed Ben Bella’s successor possessed legitimacy in his own right, 
and did not become mired in a power struggle with the imprisoned Ben Bella.  The 
Somoza regime failed to collapse the Sandinista insurgency because both Carlos Fonseca 
Amador and Pedro Joaquín Chamorro named successors to their respective organizations.  
Therefore, prior to engaging in a strategy of targeted killing or targeted incarceration, the 
state should gather intelligence and collect specific information points to determine 
whether the leader of the insurgency has declared a successor, and whether that successor 
possesses the legitimacy to lead the organization.  The determination of whether to kill or 
incarcerate the leader relies on a separate set of data points. 
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A great deal of debate surrounds the question of whether targeted killing or 
targeted incarceration is more effective in reducing insurgent violence.  The case studies 
examined in this thesis, suggest that both targeted killing and targeted incarceration are 
effective in reducing insurgent violence.  Following the death of Fathi Shikaki, the 
Palestinian Islamic Jihad failed to mount a significant attack against Israel until 2002 
when the Second Intifada began.  Likewise, the incarceration of Abimael Guzman 
reduced the Shining Path’s attacks to an insignificant number five years after his capture.  
Both Shikaki and Guzman believed in the complete overthrow and destruction of the 
state’s authority.  Both Leaders fiercely resisted any negotiated settlement with the state.  
Though Guzman was briefly coerced into reconciling with the state while in prison, he 
recanted his statements quickly.  Both Shikaki and Guzman failed to become martyrs due 
to environmental conditions.  Shikaki led the Palestinian Islamic Jihad while peace 
negotiations between the Israelis and Palestinian Authority were occurring.  After the 
death of Shikaki, the Palestinian Authority prevented the elevation of Shikaki to martyr 
status and quelled any potential Palestinian Islamic Jihad violence.  Guzman also failed to 
become a martyr due to environmental conditions.  Guzman and the Shining Path were 
on the verge of victory in Peru when he was captured.  The capture deflated the 
momentum of the Shining Path and Guzman’s coerced and short lived reconciliation with 
the government eroded some of his cult of personality.  The lack of leadership and 
support within the Shining Path prevented the fashioning of Guzman into a martyr.  
Ultimately, the determination to kill or incarcerate an insurgent leader depends on the 
determination of the ground force commander and mission requirements 
This study possesses implications for the future targeting of insurgent leaders in 
Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the Horn of Africa.  The United States continues to 
target Mullah Mohammed Omar, the leader of the Taliban, through both direct action 
operations with Special Operations Forces and Predator drone strikes.  However, the 
targeted killing of Mullah Omar will not cause the Taliban to collapse.  Mullah Omar’s 
second in command, Mullah Abdul Ghani Barader, has maintained de facto control over 
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the Taliban for the last three years.239  However, in December 2009 Mullah Omar 
declared Mullah Barader and Mullah Abdul Qayum Zakir co-head military commanders 
of the Taliban.240  With Mullah Berader’s capture in February 2010, Mullah Zakir 
possesses the sole legitimacy to succeed Mullah Omar as the leader of the Taliban.  As 
the self proclaimed “leader of the faithful” Mullah Omar’s death would likely galvanize 
Taliban support behind Mullah Zakir and eliminate any chance of a negotiated 
settlement.  Killing both Mullah Omar and Mullah Zakir in a single attack would likely 
eliminate any legitimate successor to Mullah Omar and cause extensive infighting within 
the organization.  The incarceration of Mullah Omar may represent a more feasible and 
positive outcome for the United States.  With Mullah Omar in prison, the United States 
can acquire valuable intelligence for additional operations.  Zakir, as the clear successor, 
would assume full control of the Taliban’s strategic decisions.  As a former Guantanamo 
Bay detainee, Mullah Zakir possesses a more hard line ideology and is unlikely to 
negotiate with Afghanistan’s President Hamid Karzai.  The incarceration of Mullah Omar 
may prevent a popular uprising in Afghanistan, but it will not open the door for a 
negotiated settlement to the conflict. 
Targeted killing and targeted incarceration do not provide a silver bullet to 
collapse an insurgency; however, when employed correctly, they will increase the 
counterinsurgent’s chances of prevailing in the conflict.  The mission commander should 
determine the targeting method of insurgent leaders based on the mission requirements 
and environmental conditions.  Governments should incorporate targeted killing and 
targeted incarceration as a portion of their counterinsurgency strategy, but should use 
caution in their employment against insurgent organizations when the insurgent’s 
leadership structure and operating environment are not fully known. 
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